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Recently, many developed and developing countries have adopted inflation 
targeting as the monetary policy framework.  There is large debate regarding the 
importance of external variables, such as the exchange rate, for monetary policy 
decisions under this framework, particularly in small open economies.  In the first 
chapter I explore the extent to which the adoption of an explicit inflation target in 
Mexico can be associated to a de facto change in the behavior of the central bank in 
terms of how it responds to changes in the exchange rate and other external variables, 
along with conventional variables considered relevant for monetary policy.  The results 
 
indicate the presence of a change in the behavior of the central bank in Mexico 
associated to the adoption of an explicit inflation target in January of 1999.  Variables 
such as policy credibility and the output gap tend to become more important for 
monetary policy, while the exchange rate becomes relatively less relevant when the 
inflation target is in operation.  As compared to the cases of New Zealand and Canada -
two small open economies that have successfully followed this policy prescription- the 
results suggest that monetary policy implementation in Mexico has become much more 
like in those countries.   
In the second chapter I present a modified version of Drazen and Masson 
(1994), where instead of assuming exogenous unemployment persistence, an 
endogenous externality from choosing positive inflation is imposed on unemployment.  
In face of an adverse shock to unemployment, a policymaker that generates surprise 
inflation to offset such shock will generate a negative spillover that will translate into 
future higher unemployment.  The result is that this constitutes an additional channel 
for commitment to zero inflation other than the signaling/reputation channel.  This 
modification may contribute to explain, on the one hand, why a policymaker that is 
highly committed to lower inflation may still inflate under extreme circumstances, and, 
on the other, why the central bank in countries like Mexico, where credibility may still 
be an issue, continue to follow a stringent monetary policy at a cost of “sluggish” 






DOES THE EXCHANGE RATE MATTER FOR MONETARY POLICY UNDER 










Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the 
University of Maryland, College Park in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of 











Professor Carmen M. Reinhart, Chair 
Professor Fernando Broner 
Professor Mac (I.M.) Destler 
Dr. Peter Isard 






















To Danielle Ann 







LIST OF TABLES             v 
 
LIST OF FIGURES           vii 
 
Chapter 1.   Determinants of the Monetary Policy Rule 
in Mexico from 1996 to 2001.         1 
Introduction.              1 
Estimating a Policy Reaction Function in Theory and in Practice.      6 
The Case of Mexico.          14 
 Monetary Policy Overview: From Domestic Credit 
Targeting to Inflation Targeting.        14 
 Estimating a Monetary Policy Rule for Mexico  
From 1996 to 2001.         19 
  Equation Specification.       20 
  The Data and Construction of Variables.     23 
 Some Preliminary Results Using Monthly Data.     25 
  OLS and GMM Estimations: From 1996 to 2001.      28 
  Analysis of Multiple Endogenous Structural Changes.   33 
  Further Analysis of The Mexican Case:  
 Estimations Using Daily Data.      46 
  Multiple Endogenous Structural Changes 
 and Sub-sample Results.       51 
Evidence from Canada and New Zealand.         62 
 The Case of New Zealand From 1985 to 2001.     63 
  Monetary Policy Overview:  
 Adoption of Inflation Targeting.       63 
  Estimating a Policy Reaction Function 
 for New Zealand From 1988 to 2001.     68 
 The Case of Canada From 1989 to 2001.      73 
  Monetary Policy Overview:  
 From Money Targeting to Inflation Targeting.     73 
  Estimating a Policy Reaction Function for Canada: 
 From 1989 to 2001.        76 
 Summing Up: The Three Cases Contrasted.      84 
Conclusions.           87 
Chapter 2.   Reputation and Endogenous Persistence.      91 
Introduction.            91 
Inflation Targeting: Some Important Issues.      93 
 Information and Control under Inflation Targeting.      93 
 Inflation Targeting in Small Open Economies.     94 
 Inflation Targeting and Exchange Rate Fluctuations.      95 
iv 
Inflation Targeting in Mexico: Some Stylized Facts.     97 
The Model.         103 
Conclusions.         111 
Appendix 1.          112 
Appendix 2.          114 
Appendix 3.          122 
Appendix 4.          125 
Appendix 5.          126 
Appendix 6.          127 
References.          128 
 
v 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
 
Table 1.1.  OLS with NW Std. Errors for the Full Sample 
 Using Monthly Data for Mexico       29 
Table 1.2.  GMM Estimations for the Full Sample  
 Using Monthly Data for Mexico       32 
Table 1.3.  Structural Change Tests for Mexico at January 1999    33 
Table 1.4A.  Endogenous Structural Change Tests for Mexico  
 Using Monthly Data         39 
Table 1.4B.  Endogenous Structural Change Tests for Mexico  
 Using Monthly Data         41 
Table 1.5.  Full Sample and Suggested Sub-samples for Mexico  
 Using Monthly Data (OLS and GMM Estimations)     42 
Table 1.6.  Regression in First Differences for Mexico  
 Using Monthly Data         46 
Table 1.7.  OLS with NW Std. Errors for the Full Sample  
 Using Daily Data for Mexico        49 
Table 1.8.  GMM Estimations for the Full Sample  
 Using Daily Data for Mexico        51 
Table 1.9.  GMM Estimations for the Full Sample and Selected Sub-samples 
 Using Daily Data for Mexico (specification in (b) of Table 1.8)   55 
Table 1.10.  GMM Estimations for the Full Sample and Selected Sub-samples 
 Using Daily Data for Mexico (specification in (d) of Table 1.8)   56 
Table 1.11.  GMM Estimations for the Full Sample and Selected Sub-samples  
 Using Daily Data for Mexico (specification in (e) of Table 1.8)   58 
Table 1.12.  GMM Estimations for the Full Sample Using Daily Data 
 for Mexico (testing for non- linearity)        60 
Table 1.13.  GMM Estimations between January and October of 1998 
 Using Daily Data for Mexico (testing for non- linearity)     61 
Table 1.14.  GMM Estimations for the Full Sample and Selected Sub-samples 
 Using Quarterly Data for New Zealand       69 
vi 
Table 1.15.  GMM Estimations for the Full Sample and Selected Sub-samples 
 Using Quarterly Data for New Zealand (continued)     71 
Table 1.16.  GMM Estimations for the Full Sample 
 Using Monthly Data for Canada       80 
Table 1.17.  GMM Estimations for the Full Sample and Selected  
 Sub-samples Using Monthly Data for Canada     83 
Table 1.18.  Summary of Key Results        86 
Box 1.1.  Monetary Policy in Mexico from 1996 to 2001     17 
Box 1.2.  Monetary Policy in New Zealand from 1985 to 2001    66 





LIST OF FIGURES 
 
 
Figure 1.1.   Observed and Announced Inflation       16 
Figure 1.2.   Yearly Inflation and Exchange Rate Depreciation     16 
Figure 1.3.   Expected and Target Inflation for the Next 12 Months     19 
Figure 1.4.   Monetary Policy Instrument Rate (Tasa de Fondeo Bancario)   40 
Figure 1.5.   Underlying Inflation, Headline Inflation 
  and Implied Target in New Zealand        65 
Figure 1.6.   Headline Inflation, Core Inflation and Inflation Target in Canada   75 
Figure 1.7.   Target Rate, Money Rate and Bank Rate in Canada     78 
Figure 2.1.   Observed and Announced Inflation       99 
Figure 2.2.   Expected and Target Inflation for the Next 12 Months   100 
Figure 2.3.   Country Risk        101 
Figure 2.4.   Real GDP Growth       102 
 
1 
“…while monetary policy makes progress as a science, it 
is still something of a black art…” 
Donald Brash1 
 
Chapter 1.  Determinants of the Monetary Policy Rule in Mexico from 1996 to 
2001. 
 
1.1.  Introduction. 
During the past decade, many countries followed New Zealand in establishing 
an explicit inflation target as their monetary policy objective.  The reasons that led 
these countries to adopt inflation targets and the circumstances that prevailed at the 
moment of its adoption were quite different among them, but the goal was basically the 
same: to keep inflation rates low.  Canada for example, adopted an inflation target after 
completing relatively successful disinflation program, while the United Kingdom 
adopted this policy after facing the collapse of its exchange rate regime.  More recently, 
some developing countries such as Mexico and Chile in Latin America, Israel and 
Turkey in the Middle East and Thailand in Asia, have also adopted inflation targeting.  
In Mexico and Thailand, inflation targets were adopted after the collapse of 
predetermined exchange rates as nominal anchors under relatively unstable conditions.  
Conversely, in Israel and Chile inflation targets were adopted under relative stability, 
and in conjunction with a predetermined exchange rate regime rather than instead of it.   
While most of the theoretical and empirical literature on inflation targeting 
focuses largely on closed economies where only conventional variables such as the 
output gap and the deviations of observed inflation from a specific target are 
considered explicitly for monetary policy while exchange rates and other external 
                                                 
1 Address to the Institute for International Economic Studies, Stockholm, June 1998. 
2 
factors have a secondary role or are even fully ignored,2 a more recent line of research 
explicitly considers the role of these variables for monetary policy decisions.3  This 
research provides a formal background to the idea that changes in the exchange rate 
and other external variables are relevant for monetary policy decisions in the context of 
an optimizing monetary authority with an inflation target as one of its policy objectives, 
since it incorporates the idea that economies are open with free capital mobility, where 
the exchange rate is key to the transmission mechanism of monetary policy, giving a 
role to external variables.   
An interesting point in this literature is that it has identified three key conditions 
for inflation targeting to be successful not only in reducing inflation, but also in 
reducing variations of inflation and output from some specific levels.  These conditions 
are: the announcement of an inflation target; the need for a monetary policy rule; and 
the achievement of exchange rate flexibility.  The relevance of the first condition is 
reflected on the fact that many countries follow explicit inflation targets, and that 
central banks convey their goals to the public in a relatively clear and informative 
fashion through periodic monetary policy reports where they explain the events that 
lead them to take specific paths of action.  With respect to the second condition, it has 
been somewhat established that the rule should fulfill conditions of operationality, 
simplicity, feasibility and others, and should provide guidance for monetary policy 
                                                 
2 See Taylor (1999), Bernanke et al (1999), . 
3 See for example Svensson (1998), Ball (2000) and Clarida, Galí and Gertler (2001). 
3 
rather than implemented strictly.4  Arguably, the third condition is valid for closed 
economies or developed countries.  But given the discussion above, it is not clear to 
what extent exchange rate changes and other external variables should be taken into 
account for monetary policy for the case of small open economies, particularly under 
inflation targeting.   
Even though it has been documented that exchange rate regimes have been 
moving towards either hard pegs or free floating and away from intermediate 
arrangements, the idea of “degrees” of flexibility appears to have empirical support, 
since some studies argue that in many cases this shift is only apparent, and have 
identified what is called fear of floating.  This concept refers to the observation of an 
“excess stability” of the exchange rate whenever the official announcement is of free 
floating.5  The key result from these studies for the present discussion is that fear of 
floating is observed even in countries with inflation targets.  This is fully consistent 
with the theoretical argument described that external variables are relevant for 
monetary policy implementation but it is not so with the idea that exchange rate 
flexibility is necessary for inflation targeting to be successful, particularly in small 
open economies that follow inflation targets.  It can be argued fear of floating in these 
countries is a matter of economic policy consistency, and that there are different 
                                                 
4 See for example Svensson (2001).  See also Kydland and  Prescott (1995), Taylor (1999) and 
references therein. 
5 See for example Calvo and Reinhart (2000), Hausmann, Panizza and Stein (2000) and Lahiri and Végh 
(2001). 
4 
“degrees” of exchange rate flexibility that small open inflation targeting countries can 
cope with and therefore the flexibility condition should be interpreted with caution.   
This paper explores the extent to which the central bank in a small open 
economy that follows an explicit inflation target responds to changes in the exchange 
rate and other external variables,  along with conventional variables considered relevant 
for monetary policy.  In particular, the reaction function of the central bank of Mexico 
is estimated as a modified instrument rule where the policy variable responds to 
conventional variables such as the output gap, and a measure of policy credibility 
(usually for closed economies and developed countries), as well as changes in the 
exchange rate, and other external variables.6  This policy rule is then subject to tests for 
structural changes and re-estimated for different sub-samples to explore whether the 
adoption of an explicit inflation target can be associated with a de facto change in the 
behavior of the central bank in terms of its responses to these variables.  The statistical 
significance and the magnitude of the coefficients of the explanatory variables in each 
sub-sample are directly interpreted as changes in the relative importance the central 
bank assigns to them.  Finally, the results are contrasted to similar estimations for New 
Zealand and Canada, two small open economies that have successfully implemented 
inflation targets.   
                                                 
6 It is important to keep in mind that estimating a reduced form such as the one presented here does not 
necessarily capture the “true” policy reaction function.  The most appropriate means to identify a policy 
reaction function is through the construction of an entire macro model (which includes a Phillips curve, 
an aggregate demand curve, a loss function for the authority, et cetera).  The estimates of the reaction 
function would nonetheless be conditional on the assumptions for the model itself. 
5 
The results indicate the presence of a de facto change in the behavior of the 
central bank in Mexico associated with the adoption of the inflation target; 
conventional variables such as policy credibility and the output gap tend to become 
more important for monetary policy under inflation targeting while the exchange rate 
has explanatory power only before the adoption of this policy framework.  In contrast, 
for New Zealand and Canada one cannot establish a clear link between the official 
change in policy regime and a change in policy behavior; conventional variables are 
significant and relatively stable while the exchange rate is never significant regardless 
of the inflation target.  These results are interpreted as an indication that monetary 
policy in Mexico has become more similar to that in New Zealand and Canada.  
Additionally, as compared with these two countries, the results suggest that fear of 
exchange rate floating was purely transitional for the case of Mexico, since the 
exchange rate plays no significant role on explaining the behavior of the monetary 
policy instrument for Canada or New Zealand, and it does so for Mexico only before 
the inflation target was adopted.   
The paper is organized as follows.  The next section explores the theoretical and 
empirical literature on the use of different specifications of monetary policy rules to 
proxy the behavior of the monetary authority, with particular interest on (small) open 
economies.  In Section 3, using different techniques, a modified Taylor rule is 
estimated for Mexico from 1996 to 2001.  These estimations are then subject to 
endogenous structural change tests to assess the extent to which the behavior of the 
central bank has changed over that period.  Based on these tests, different sub-samples 
are compared to quantify the extent of these changes by looking at the magnitude and 
6 
econometric significance of the parameters included.  Section 4 contrasts the evidence 
from Mexico with that of New Zealand and Canada using a similar approach, and 
provides a summary of the differences and similarities between these three countries in 
terms of monetary policy behavior.  Section 5 concludes.   
 
1.2.  Estimating a Policy Reaction Function in Theory and in Practice. 
It is quite difficult first to delimit the literature on monetary policy rules, and 
second to separate the purely theoretical from the purely empirical literature on this 
topic.  The purely theoretical work goes back to the Barro-Gordon (1983a,b) approach, 
where they consider a policymaker that minimizes a loss function in terms of 
deviations of observed inflation from some target, and deviations of output from its 
potential level, subject to a Phillips curve-type of tradeoff.  As a result, the 
policymaker’s optimal choice for inflation depends on the public’s expectations, 
deriving a policy reaction function.  There is a vast literature based on this approach 
that studies how the monetary authorities choose inflation optimally, where the focus is 
mostly on reputational issues and strategic behavior under specific assumptions about 
information.  One could consider for example the time inconsistency approach of 
Kydland and Prescott (1977) and that of Calvo (1978); the signaling models of Backus 
and Driffill (1985a,b), Canzoneri (1985), and Vickers (1986); or the information 
imperfections model of Drazen and Masson (1994), among many others, as purely 
theoretical models of monetary policy reaction functions.7  In these cases, the policy 
                                                 
7 See Drazen (2000) for a complete survey of this literature, which borrows analytical tools from game 
theory. 
7 
reaction function is not fully derived, but instead it consists of a set of conditions under 
which different types of equilibria may arise.8   
There is another set of research on policy reaction functions, based on the 
original setup developed by Barro and Gordon as well.  One of the main differences 
from the previous literature is that there are no information asymmetries that induce the 
type of strategic behavior needed to explore reputational issues.  Instead, the use of 
additional macroeconomic theory is incorporated to derive expressions of some policy 
instrument (mostly an interest rate) as a function of variables that provide information 
on the stance of the economy over time.  These expressions, known as monetary policy 
rules or instrument rules, are variants of what is known as a Taylor rule (see below), 
and typically include the standard variables in the Barro-Gordon setup, but also include 
other economic variables.  Clearly, the goal of this part of the literature is different 
from the one described above, which is nothing but to test for the applicability, 
robustness, and other properties of different policy reaction functions.9   
In general, this “second” literature can be classified in two broad groups.  The 
first group consists on models of microeconomic foundations that derive policy rules 
based on dynamic optimization setups.  Most of them introduce a representative agent 
that maximizes some expected utility over time subject to different constraints.  While 
some of these models consider that expectations are rational, in many of them the 
                                                 
8 Equilibria in the sense used in Game Theory. 
9 It is worth mentioning that there appears to be no intersection between the purely theoretical approach 
of the reputational models mentioned, and those models that emphasize the viability of modified 
instrument rules, though the ultimate objective is to assess their welfare implications.   
8 
intertemporal optimization decisions are solved separately.  Also, in general, the 
models in this group are mostly designed to be used for closed economy environments.   
The second group of models is based on general macroeconomic theory, where 
the setup is relatively more ad hoc rather than developed from micro-foundations, and 
expectations are in many cases non-rational.  Despite this drawback, the rules derived 
from this group consistently outperform those derived from the first one in terms of 
empirical accuracy, and are considered more robust.  Some of the models in this group 
focus on issues related to open economies so that other variables like the exchange rate 
are included, and they also consider econometric issues such as endogeneity and 
measurement error.   
As Taylor (1999) points out, the models in both groups are general equilibrium, 
dynamic, stochastic models that rely on some short-run nominal rigidity in order to 
generate a Phillips curve-type of tradeoff.  The micro models rely mostly on 
monopolistic competition across firms, such that market power induces price rigidities 
that in turn generate deviations of output from its potential (see for example King and 
Wolman [1999] and Clarida, Galí and Gertler [1999a]).  On the other hand, the macro 
models assume an expectations-augmented Phillips curve, more in line with the 
original setup, such that inflation surprises affect real activity in the short run (see for 
example Ball [2000]).   
There are two important features of the literature on monetary policy rules.  On 
the one hand, the goal is to address the extent to which these rules fit into existing 
macro models and generate accurate predictions.  McCallum and Nelson (1999) explain 
that some studies of monetary policy try to promote research strategies that emphasize 
9 
robustness and operationality of policy rules.  Robustness refers to a policy rule’s 
performance in different macroeconomic models, that is, the tractability of the rule and 
its ability to generate low variations of both output and inflation around some specific 
targets.  Operationality refers to whether a monetary policy rule is feasible, i.e., it 
should be stated in terms of policy instruments that could in fact be controlled 
frequently by the central bank.  On the other hand, the goal is to improve the likeliness 
to implement these rules in real- life policymaking, that is, to improve the extent to 
which a central bank can actually rely on these rules for monetary policy 
implementation.  John Taylor (1999) argues that simplicity of monetary policy rules is 
crucial for these purposes, not only from the operational point of view, but also in the 
sense that a central bank should be able to explain to the public what it is doing.   
The different types of models ultimately derive expressions that can be 
estimated econometrically.  These expressions, as already mentioned, specify an 
instrument variable, which in most cases is a short run interest rate, as a function of 
other macroeconomic variables.  The first and perhaps most general specification of a 
monetary policy rule is that proposed by Taylor (1993).  Based on the quantity 
equation, he derives rather informally an expression where the nominal interest rate (it) 
responds to lagged inflation (π t-1), the deviation of lagged inflation from a specific 




ttttt yyii −+−++= −− βππαπ     (1) 
 
10 
where i* denotes the long run interest rate consistent with full employment and no 
inflation deviations from the target.  Taylor (1998) shows that (1) provides a good 
description of the actions of the Federal Reserve during the Volcker-Greenspan 
administration.   
Abstracting from the lack of a formal theoretical derivation, the above 
expression has several drawbacks.  The first problem of Taylor’s specification is that it 
is completely backward looking, and therefore non-rational expectations are implicitly 
embedded in the underlying optimization problem that generates that rule.  As 
mentioned, Taylor is not the only one who has considered backward looking 
expectations for individuals in this type of analysis.  Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) 
for example, assume adaptive expectations when studying country cases of explicit 
inflation targets.   
On the opposite extreme, Batini and Haldane (1999) and Clarida et al (1999a), 
instead of using lags of inflation, introduce a “forward looking approach” by 
considering expected inflation at period t for j periods ahead minus the target 
announced at t for j periods ahead (Etπ t+ j - jtt +,π ), a measure of credibility, as an 
explanatory variable for the monetary policy instrument.10  This is called inflation-
forecast targeting; the central bank targets precisely a forecast for inflation for several 
periods ahead, which from a theoretical point of view allows for a more accurate 
assumption of rational (forward- looking) expectations for all agents.   
                                                 
10 Nonetheless, they explain that any forward-looking rule can be given a backward looking 
representation (see Taylor [1999]). 
11 
A second problem of Taylor’s specification in (1) is that it does not consider the 
observation that in many cases the interest rate is relatively stable over time, suggesting 
that central banks pursue some degree of interest rate smoothing since a highly volatile 
interest rate may affect financial stability.  The argument is that interest rate smoothing 
reduces output volatility, particularly in face of recurrent money demand shocks, and it 
can prevent portfolio mismatches of considerable importance.  Rotemberg and 
Woodford (1999) for example, include a lag of the interest rate on the right hand side 
of  (1) when studying monetary policy in the US, formalized by Rudebusch and 
Svensson (1999) by adding a “smoothing-motive” term to the policymaker’s objective 
function of the form α (it  - it-1)2.   
Another drawback of (1) and perhaps the most relevant for the present purposes 
is that it is mostly appropriate for either closed economies or large open economies.  
Svensson (1998) argues that “other variables” that account for economic openness 
should be considered explicitly in monetary policy.  He asserts that “[a]ll real world 
inflation targeting economies are quite open with free capital mobility, where shocks 
originating [abroad] are important, and where the exchange rate plays a prominent role 
in the transmission mechanism of monetary policy”. 11  For example, he identifies an 
aggregate demand channel and a direct channel through which the exchange rate affects 
domestic price behavior, and therefore inflation and output.  Moreover, Svensson 
argues that not only the exchange rate should be considered in monetary policy 
decisions, but the role of external shocks should be taken into account by policymakers 
as well.  Ball (2000) explores these arguments by extending the use of Taylor’s 
                                                 
11 Svensson (1998), p. 3. 
12 
proposition to an open economy framework.  He incorporates the real exchange rate 
and the rate of change of the nominal exchange rate as explanatory variables for the 
interest rate -on the right hand side of (1) above- arguing that “d ifferent rules are 
required [for open economies] since monetary policy affects the economy through the 
exchange rate channel as well as the interest rate channel”.12 
Finally, there is some debate in terms of what the instrument variable (the left-
hand side variable) should be.  Most studies use an overnight primary interest rate on 
banks’ funds or inter-bank transactions as the policy instrument.  Batini and Haldane 
(1999) argue that the relevant variable for decision-making is the ex-ante real interest 
rate, and therefore it should be the one considered as the policy instrument.  In this 
regard, Taylor (1993) explains that the appropriate management of the nominal interest 
rate by the monetary authority should be exactly to affect the real interest rate in order 
to stabilize the economy, so that the use of either is practically equivalent so long as 
inflation expectations are somewhat stable.  Levin, Wieland and Williams (1999) use 
changes in the interest rate on the left hand side of the rule instead of leve ls.  They test 
for the robustness of different Taylor rules for four different underlying models for the 
US and find strong support in favor of rules that use changes in the interest rate as the 
instrument variable in terms of tractability and robustness.  Finally, it has also been 
argued that the policy instrument should be some monetary aggregate (a quantity 
restriction of some sort) rather than the short-run interest rate.  But as Clarida et al 
(1999a) point out, there is an observational equivalence from using a monetary 
                                                 
12 He proposes the use of a weighted average of interest rates and exchange rates, known as a monetary 
conditions index (MCI), as the appropriate policy instrument for small open economies.   
13 
aggregate or an interest rate so long as one is able to identify shocks to money demand.  
Otherwise, a money target would induce large interest rate fluctuations that may 
translate into higher variability of output and consequently a higher loss to the 
authority. 13   
The most recent issue discussed in the literature is the practical validity of 
instrument rules as the one described in (1) and those discussed above relative to what 
is known as target rules, that specify operational objectives for monetary policy or a set 
of conditions for the target variables.14  Svensson (2001a) highlights four basic 
objections to the use of Taylor-type of rules for monetary policy conduction.  First, he 
argues that they are not always optimal, particularly if there is some learning process 
for the central bank; second that they give no room for the use of judgment and for 
what is called extra-model information, which he argues is particularly important under 
model uncertainty; 15 third, that given the suboptimality of instrument rules, there must 
be “recommitment” from the monetary authority, and dynamic inconsistency problems 
may arise; and finally, that they are not that operational, that is, no central bank has 
ever fully committed to a rule of this type.  As an alternative, Svensson proposes the 
use of target rules since they include clear objectives or specific rules in the form of a 
set of conditions for the forecast of target variables, and they outperform policy rules in 
                                                 
13 Some countries that adopted a money target have abandoned it due to this problem.  The relationship 
between the instrument and the velocity of money weakened due to the high volatility of the latter, which 
severely narrows the scope for monetary policy with an intermediate target. 
14 See Svensson (2001b). 
15 See also Levin, Wieland and Williams (1999).   
14 
terms of operationality and robus tness.  The problem with this argument is exactly that 
no central bank commits to Taylor-type of specifications blindfolded and there is 
indeed some room for judgment; what is called “constrained discretion”, 16 and Taylor-
type rules or instrument rules for that matter, provide for a useful guidance in the 
conduct of monetary policy (see Taylor [2000]). 
 
1.3.  The Case of Mexico. 
1.3.1.  Monetary Policy Overview: From Domestic Credit Targeting to Inflation 
Targeting. 
From late 1990 until the end of 1994, Mexico observed a sound fiscal stance, an 
exchange rate band was properly at work, inflation was low relative to previous years 
and overall macroeconomic performance was reasonable if not spectacular.  In the last 
days of 1994, the central bank let the currency float against the US dollar, which led to 
a significant depreciation of the peso and a new surge in inflation.  In an attempt to 
offsetting the inflationary effects of the devaluation and regaining stability, the 
authorities decided to follow an explicit monetary aggregate target where domestic 
credit was to remain within certain limits during a one-year period.  A zero average 
legal reserve requirement for commercial banks was also imposed in order to limit 
interest rate volatility through determining penalization rates for excess liquidity 
demanded.17   
                                                 
16 Bernanke and Mishkin (1997). 
17 Between 1995 and 1998, the central bank sometimes reduced this requirement to a negative number, 
putting the banking system “short” of cash; although full liquidity was still provided when needed, the 
15 
 
The Federal Government and the central bank agreed upon pursuing goals for 
yearly CPI inflation, without considering them as official targets.18  As Figure 1.1 
shows, even though by December of 1997 observed inflation almost hit the proposed 
target, it continued to stay above that target until 1999.  This was perhaps in part due to 
the remaining costs brought about by the collapse of the exchange rate band and in part 
due to the situation that prevailed in other emerging economies.  Indeed, the Asian and 
Russian crises of 1997 and 1998 affected Mexico’s exchange rate volatility to the 
extent that, given a relatively high passthrough to prices at the time,19 it jeopardized the 
goal of bringing inflation back to the proposed target.  The significant depreciation of 
the Mexican peso during the second half of 1998 forced the central bank to intervene 
directly in the foreign exchange market in September.  Nonetheless, yearly inflation 
reached a peak of about 20 percent that year.  In light of these events, the monetary 
authority decided to revise its inflation goal for 1999.  Figure 1.2 illustrates the close 
relationship between exchange rate changes and observed inflation.   
 
                                                                                                                                              
excess portion was penalized at a higher-than-market cost.  This scheme, known as el corto prevails as 
the monetary policy instrument in Mexico, see Box 1.1.  For a detailed description of the operation of 
monetary policy since 1995 see Carstens and Werner (1999) and references therein.   
18 These non-official targets were published in official monetary reports.  It was disclosed that the role of 
the central bank was to conduct its monetary policy to collaborate on the achievement of these goals.  
See Informe Anual, Banco de México (various volumes).   
19 See Garcés (1999). 
16 


























































































































































































































































































































































































Box 1.1. Monetary Policy in Mexico from 1996 to 2001 
 
-Floating since 1995 (after collapse of exchange rate 
band).  
-Intermediate regime (domestic credit target)from 1995 to 
1998. 
-Unofficial goals for yearly CPI inflation from 1995 to 
1998. 
-Unstable relationship between domestic credit and 
velocity of money. 
-Failure to achieve proposed targets prior to 1999. 
-Adoption of scheme: January 1999 (CPI point target, then 
range). 
-Announcement at the beginning of the year for end-of-
year annualized inflation rate. 
-External shocks: Asia (1997), Russia (1998), Brazil 
(1999). 
-Instrument: commercial banks’ cash balances (borrowed 
reserves) in central bank (el corto). 
-Reduced inflation from almost 20% in 1998 to about 4% 
in 2001. 
 
In January 1999 an explicit inflation target was announced for the first time, 
setting a point goal of 13 percent for the end of that year.  The shift in policy 
determination was mostly due to the observed weakening of the relationship between 
the demand for money and the domestic credit target in use, and to the difficulties 
derived from the external environment during the previous years.20  Despite the 
                                                 
20 See Informe Anual, Banco de México (various volumes). 
18 
Brazilian crisis in early 1999 and the upward revision of the inflation target for the end 
of that year, the higher transparency in monetary policy and the relative stability abroad 
were beneficial in the sense that inflation expectations fell considerably, as shown in 
Figure 1.3.21  Note that the observed rebounds on inflation expectations coincide with 
the occurrence of external factors: the Asian and Russian crises before 1999 and oil 
price fluctuations after that.  These shocks directly affected the exchange rate (see 
Figure 1.2), and consequently people’s inflation expectations, which likely translated 
into credibility losses.   
The central bank has met its targets since 1999 and, at the same time, it has 
increased the credibility of such announcements, an accomplishment that constitutes a 
very important gain resulting from the adoption of the target.  The observed persistence 
in the gap between announced and expected inflation (interpreted here as lack of 
credibility) until practically the end of 2001 remains an open question yet to be 
answered.  The scheme is considered successful since inflation has fallen from almost 
20 percent in 1998 to about 4 percent in 2001. 
 
                                                 
21 Inflation expectations data are available from surveys conducted by the central bank (see Section 3.3.2 
below for further details). 
19 
































































































































































































1.3.2.  Estimating a Monetary Policy Rule for Mexico From 1996 to 2001. 
In the present section I explore the policy reaction function of the central bank 
in Mexico between 1996 and 2001, and attempt to identify whether the adoption of an 
explicit inflation target in that country has affected the way the central bank responds to 
changes in the exchange rate and other external variables, taking into account other 
conventional variables for monetary policy decisions.  Based on the discussion about 
monetary policy rules outlined in Section 2, and given the nature of the Mexican 
economy, it is clear that direct estimation of a rule like (1) above would be 
inappropriate.  Instead, since it can be argued that Mexico is following an inflation 
forecast target de facto, a forward looking policy reaction function is considered along 
the lines of Batini and Haldane (1999) and Clarida et al (1999a).  Also, by including 
20 
other external variables, this approach allows me to identify the extent to which 
exchange rate flexibility is crucial for inflation targeting to be successful, and allows to 
search for further evidence with respect to the fear of floating phenomenon in Mexico.  
This will allow me to ultimately determine whether there has been a shift towards “pure 
inflation targeting” and away from any other type of commitment. 
1.3.2.1.  Equation Specification. 
According to the discussion outlined in Section 2, the specification of  any 
monetary policy rule should capture the forward looking nature of the problem faced 
by the monetary authority.  This implies taking into consideration information 
regarding individuals’ expectations whenever possible.  Also, given the nature of the 
financial sector in that country, the need for a rule that allows for interest rate 
smoothing should be considered.  Perhaps most importantly for the purpose of the 
present analysis is the idea that external factors should be taken into account for 
monetary policy in a small open economy like Mexico.  This leads to the explicit 
inclusion of variables that capture such factors.  By introducing the exchange rate 
depreciation rate, the interest rate on long term Mexican government bonds abroad as a 
proxy of country risk, and the percentage change of the terms of trade as explanatory 
variables, the specification will capture precisely the fact that Mexico is a small open 
economy subject to external shocks, and that there is an additional channel through 
which monetary policy works in this type of country.  In principle, the estimated rule 
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where: 
it is the annualized one-day interest rate (the monetary policy 
instrument, see below)  
Etπt+12 - 12+ttπ  is the difference between the public’s expectations of inflation 
for the next 12 months as of time t minus the announced inflation 
target for the next 12 months as of time t (labeled as the 
“inflation gap” or the “credibility measure” hereafter) 









 ∆  is the monthly rate of change of the exchange rate in the previous 
j periods (defined in domestic currency per unit of foreign 
currency) 23 
gov
ti  is the interest rate on long term Mexican Government bonds 
abroad 
                                                 
22 The time subscripts s and j represent the use of (different) lags instead of contemporaneous 
observations of the corresponding variables both under slightly modified specifications of (2) and under 
the use of different data frequencies (see below).   










 ∆  is the monthly rate of change of the terms of trade in the 
previous j periods 
ut   is an iid shock with zero mean and finite variance 
 
The inclusion of the exchange rate depreciation rate exactly aims to exploring 
the extent to which this variable is taken into account for monetary policy decisions 
under inflation targeting given other variables considered relevant for this purpose.  It 
also provides for a simple tool to explore the nature of the documented fear of floating 
phenomenon.  The country risk variable ( govti ) allows to control for the impact of the 
perception of foreign investors over the exchange rate, that is, to control for the 
occurrence of other external shocks that may affect capital flows, which play a key role 
in exchange rate determination in small open economies like Mexico.   The coefficient 
of this variable will reflect the role that the central bank assigns to this perception in 
monetary policy.  Also, the coefficient associated to exchange rate changes will be 
cleaned from any effects of this variable over the policy instrument.  The inclusion of 
the terms of trade variable allows to control for variations in foreign or controlled 
prices.  Alternatively it may account for supply side shocks that affect monetary 
policy. 24 
As mentioned, the use of the gap between expected and announced inflation 
captures the forward looking nature of the problem faced by the monetary authority.  
                                                 
24 An alternative exercise would be to use a measure of underlying inflation, i.e., inflation excluding 
highly volatile items.   
23 
This variable and the (current) output gap measure account for conventional variables 
in the analysis classified as inflation-forecast targeting (see Section 2 above). 
1.3.2.2.  The Data and Construction of Variables. 
The raw data are available mostly from Banco de Mexico at different 
frequencies.  Among the high frequency data is the annualized one-day interest rate for 
commercial banks’ large-scale operations with other banks or the Tasa de Fondeo 
Bancario, which is the policy variable considered here (it above), available on a daily 
basis.25  Even though the true policy instrument in Mexico is the zero-average legal 
reserve requirement for commercial banks known as el corto (see Box 1.1 previously), 
this requirement directly affects the interest rate used here, exactly as if the interest rate 
was the true policy instrument.26  The nominal exchange rate is also published daily by 
the central bank and is constructed as an average of the quotes of large-scale foreign 
exchange transactions payable overnight.  It is used to settle obligations in foreign 
currency within the Mexican territory. 27  Also published daily is the interest rate of 
long term Mexican government bonds traded or held abroad (UMS26), obtained from 
Bloomberg. 28  Inflation expectations are available from the central bank biweekly.  
This series is obtained through a survey conducted by the central bank on the private 
sector and is not constructed by the central bank itself.  Since there are no monthly 
                                                 
25 This rate corresponds to large-scale overnight inter-bank operations.  It resembles the Federal Funds 
rate in the US.  See Banco de Mexico, www.banxico.org.mx for a full description about the construction 
of this interest rate. 
26 See Martinez, Sanchez and Werner (2001). 
27 See Circular 2019/95 by Banco de México.   
28 UMS26 is a long-run Mexican government debt bond held outside the country that expires in 2026. 
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series for real GDP available, output is measured by the seasonally adjusted industrial 
production index constructed by INEGI (Mexico’s Bureau of Statistics).29  This series 
is highly correlated with real GDP and is considered a good proxy for GDP in that 
country.  The terms of trade index is also published monthly.  The lowest frequency 
observations are those of the inflation targets.  They are yearly observations officially 
published by the central bank in its monetary policy reports.30   
While some of the exercises presented here were carried out using strictly 
monthly data, the higher frequencies for the instrument variable, the exchange rate, the 
UMS26, and inflation expectations allowed us to carry out several high frequency 
(daily) exercises similar to those using monthly data.  The low frequency data 
available: inflation expectations; inflation targets; and the GDP variable (and therefore 
the output gap), were interpolated correspondingly to construct daily series, with the 
exception of the terms of trade, for which the Mexican oil prices (available daily at 
Bloomberg) were used as a proxy in daily data exercises.31     
The credibility measure [Etπ t+12 - 12+ttπ ] (or inflation gap) was calculated using 
the data available on inflation expectations and linear interpolations of yearly inflation 
announcements respectively (see Figure 1.3 previously).32  Three different measures of 
                                                 
29 www.inegi.gob.mx 
30 See Banco de México, Exposición de Política Monetaria, various volumes. 
31 The advantages and disadvantages from these transformations are discussed below. 
32 The numbers between end-of-year observations for the inflation target are calculated as follows: the 
announcements for the years 2000 and 2001 were 10 percent or less and 6.5 percent or less respectively; 
thus the in-between observations assume that the central bank pursues the target monotonically towards 
the next one at a constant rate, about -0.30 per month in this particular case. 
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the output gap ( tt yy − ) were considered: deviations from a linear trend ; deviations 
from a linear and a quadratic trend ; and deviations from the Hodrick and Presscott 
(1997) filter (following Martinez, et al [2001] and others).33  The rate of change in the 
exchange rate, the rate of change in the terms of trade and the rate of change in the oil 
prices are calculated with respect to the previous month or with respect to the 
observation 30 days before.   
 
1.3.3.  Some Preliminary Results Using Monthly Data. 
The first question at this point is to determine what should be expected for the 
coefficients in (2) from a theoretical point of view.  Following the discussion in Section 
2, the coefficient of the lagged instrument (β1) is expected to be between 0 and 1 if 
there is interest rate smoothing.  β2 and β3 are associated with conventional variables 
used in practically all studies about monetary policy rules, and are directly derived 
from the standard Barro-Gordon setup.  The first variable corresponds to what has been 
labeled as the “inflation gap” or the “credibility measure” (expected minus announced 
inflation); the less credible the announcement, the larger this measure.  It is self-
explanatory that there should be a positive relationship between this variable and the 
interest rate, otherwise the central bank may accommodate people’s expectations and 
thus validate higher inflation expectations, and thus β2 should be positive.  In fact, as 
Taylor (1993) suggests, this variable should be greater than 1 in order for monetary 
policy to be stabilizing (see below), since any increases in expected inflation are more 
                                                 
33 Despite the possible shortfalls of these calculations, McCallum and Nelson (1999) highlight this 
criticism as endemic to the empirical literature on monetary policy rules.   
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than offset by the monetary authority.  The coefficient β3 is associated with what is 
known as the output gap; if output is higher than its potential level –there is a positive 
gap-, “overheating” may induce higher-than-desired inflation, and it should be offset 
through tightening monetary policy and vice-versa.  This implies a positive relationship 
between the dependent variable and the output gap, and therefore β3 should be 
positive.34   
In an environment of full exchange rate flexibility, one should expect the 
exchange rate not to affect the policy instrument (at least not directly).  In fact, for the 
case of the US economy for example, Taylor (1998) excludes this variable completely 
from the analysis.  However, the Central Bank of New Zealand, for example, considers 
this variable (and the terms of trade) explicitly in policymaking.35  Given the fear of 
floating results in the literature and Svensson’s formalizations discussed above, there is 
still debate on the extent to which the exchange rate should be explicitly considered in 
(2).  It is assumed here that the exchange rate constitutes an indicator for monetary 
policy, and therefore the significance of β4 can be interpreted directly as evidence of 
fear of floating.  More specifically, if the behavior of the exchange rate has any role for 
the central bank’s actions, then one can expect β4 to be positive and significant.  This is 
because recurrent exchange rate depreciations may induce the central bank to increase 
nominal (and real) interest rates to avoid price increases and hence keep inflation under 
control (particularly if a high passthrough prevails, as it has been the case for 
                                                 
34 If β3 is negative, then monetary policy is procyclical.  Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1999a, b) argue that if 
it is greater than 1, it implies that monetary policy is also stabilizing. 
35 See for example Bernanke et al (1999), p. 95 and references therein. 
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Mexico).36  If, on the other hand, β4 is not significant, then the exchange rate is not 
relevant for monetary policy decisions and the interpretation is of no fear of floating.   
β5 and β6 correspond to variables that are associated with external factors.  govti  









 ∆  reflects terms of trade and other external 
disturbances.  If there is a perception from foreign investors that something may “go 
bad”, govti  will tend to increase in order to compensate for the higher risks and avoid 
capital flight (all else equal).  Consequently, the instrument rate should increase 
through an interest parity condition.  If the exchange rate adjusts, then the size of this 
adjustment may depend on both the magnitude of the interest rate change and the 
exchange rate passthrough, but β5 should nonetheless be positive.  With respect to β6, a 
negative terms of trade shock or a “cost push shock” would induce a rise in the 
exchange rate and/or an increase in domestic inflation, 37 which should in turn induce a 
                                                 
36 Calvo and Reinhart (2002) argue that the fear of floating phenomenon may arise from the combination 
of lack of credibility and inflation targeting.  They associate lack of credibility with risk premium 
volatility, which translates into high exchange rate volatility and higher-than-desired inflation given full 
passthrough (not necessary for the mechanism to work).  Fear of floating implies that the monetary 
authority offsets the effects over the exchange rate derived from risk premium volatility.  For other 
arguments that explain the fear of floating phenomenon with respect to passthrough and currency 
mismatches see Hausmann et al ( 2000) and Lahiri and Végh (2001). 
37 See Edwards (1989) 
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more stringent position of the central bank and an increase in interest rates.  This 
implies that β6 should be negative.38   
1.3.3.1.  OLS and GMM Estimations: From 1996 to 2001. 
Expression (2) is estimated for the sample that goes from May of 1996 to 
December 2001.39  The results presented in Table 1.1 include slightly different 
specifications of (2).  Column (a) for example includes contemporaneous observations 
of both the rate of change of the exchange rate and the rate of change of the terms of 
trade; column (b) substitutes the terms of trade changes with the change in the price of 
oil,40 and qualitatively the results remain basically unchanged: there is evidence of 
interest rate smoothing and both the credibility gap and the output gap are significant.41  
Moreover, all external variables are significant, suggesting first that there is fear of 
floating in Mexico during this period of analysis and that both country risk and terms of 
trade shocks are also relevant for monetary policy. 
                                                 
38 In Mexico terms of trade shocks are closely linked to changes in the oil prices, which in turn are 
closely linked to public deficits.  This would imply that the use of oil prices may also reflect the stance of 
fiscal policy (or demand side shocks).   
39 We use Newey-West (1987) (NW) estimations provided the OLS residuals are not only serially 
correlated but also likely to be heteroskedastic given the nature of the series considered here according to 
the results from the corresponding tests (not reported).   
40 Among other reasons to be discussed, the use of oil price inflation is to make monthly regressions 
“comparable” with those using high frequency data (see below).   
41 (sa) stands for “seasonally adjusted”. 
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Table 1.1. OLS with NW Std. Errors for the  
Full Sample Using Monthly Data for Mexico 
(a) (b) (c) (d)
constant -13.57** -13.05* -27.37** -28.99***
(5.30) (6.65) (11.08) (10.43)
lagged nominal overnight interest rate 0.49*** 0.51*** 0.36* 0.37*
(0.10) (0.10) (0.21) (0.19)
expected - announced inflation 3.34*** 3.14*** 3.11** 3.02**
(0.86) (0.95) (1.30) (1.21)
output gap (sa) 0.50*** 0.47*** 0.58** 0.60***
(0.11) (0.12) (0.22) (0.21)
exchange rate depreciation 0.52*** 0.54*** - -
(0.13) (0.15) - -
lagged exchange rate depreciation - - -0.11 -0.17
- - (0.15) (0.15)
govt. bond yield abroad 1.85*** 1.78** 3.59** 3.75***
(0.61) (0.79) (1.39) (1.30)
change in terms of trade -0.44*** - - -
(0.15) - - -
lagged change in terms of trade - - -0.12 -
- - (0.20) -
change in oil prices - -0.01 - -
- (0.02) - -
lagged change in oil prices - - - -0.05***
- - - (0.02)
R Sq 0.93 0.92 0.88 0.88
Adj R Sq 0.92 0.91 0.86 0.87
Std. Error 1.99 2.07 2.55 2.48
Sum Squared Resid 193.90 210.90 317.63 300.30
F Stat 102.15 93.26 59.18 63.06
Prob 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
No. of Observations 56 56 56 56
*, ** and *** denote 10%, 5% and 1% significance respectively
Std. Errors in parentheses
Dependent Variable: nominal overnight interest rate 
 
 
The problem with the results in (a) and (b) is that the exchange rate and the 
country risk variable are highly correlated.  Moreover, there may be a problem of 
endogeneity between these two variables and the left hand side variable.  Interest rate 
changes may induce changes in the exchange rate and both may induce changes in 
country risk measures.  Conversely, an exogenous change in country risk may affect 
30 
both the interest rate and the exchange rate to the extent that it generates shifts in the 
direction and magnitude of international capital flows.  The use of lags on both the 
exchange rate depreciation and the changes in terms of trade allows for partially 
dealing with this issue, since right hand side variables are predetermined.  Columns (c) 
and (d) present the analogous regressions in (a) and (b) with the use of lags instead of 
contemporaneous observations of those variables, except for the risk premium variable.  
Note that the exchange rate variable is no longer significant, but the rest of the results 
remain, except for the fact that the country risk premium coefficient doubles.42  The 
implied long run coefficients for the difference between expected and announced 
inflation oscillate between 4.8 and 6.5.  For the output gap these coefficients are 
practically equal to 1, while for the rate of change in the exchange rate they oscillate 
between 1 and 1.1.  Since the output gap is constructed using index numbers, this long 
run coefficient indicates that the monetary authority was exactly accommodating 
shocks to this variable, which is also the case for changes in the exchange rate.  These 
results suggest a strongly stabilizing monetary policy in Mexico for this period.   
Given the possibility of endogeneity of right hand side variables discussed and 
the fact that the presence of the lagged dependent variable may generate spurious 
results, following Clarida et al (1999b), analogous estimations using GMM are 
presented in Table 1.2.43  It is interesting first to see that the lagged dependent variable 
is significant using GMM only for the second two regressions.  Secondly, the 
                                                 
42 Probably because of the endogeneity issue mentioned. 
43 As in Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1999b), it is assumed that all the variables (including inflation and the 
interest rate) are stationary (p. 8).  See Appendix 1. 
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coefficient for the output gap remains basically unaffected.  Third, the rest of the 
variables tend to lose explanatory power except for the exchange rate depreciation and 
the lagged change in oil prices.  Key to these estimations is that both the output gap and 
the (contemporaneous) exchange rate depreciation remain positive and significant 
regardless of the estimation methods and the use of terms of trade or oil price changes.  
Also, it is somewhat surprising that the government bond yield abroad and the terms of 
trade measures lose significance. 
The problem with the estimations in Table 1.2 is that, given the reduced number 
of observations and the need for the identification of adequate instrument variables, 
which are usually lags of the explanatory variables themselves, there is a significant 
loss in the degrees of freedom and the estimations may be misleading.  It is for this 




Table 1.2. GMM Estimations for the  
Full Sample Using Monthly Data for Mexico1/ 
(a) (b) (c) (d)
constant -41.85* -37.38 -5.37 -15.80
(23.04) (24.63) (18.45) (17.41)
lagged nominal overnight interest rate 0.28 0.34 0.61*** 0.59***
(0.25) (0.26) (0.15) (0.14)
expected - announced inflation 2.79 2.62 2.73 2.08
(2.02) (1.81) (2.39) (2.06)
output gap (sa) 0.53** 0.53** 0.53* 0.49*
(0.26) (0.23) (0.31) (0.26)
exchange rate depreciation 1.32** 1.29** - -
(0.61) (0.58) - -
lagged exchange rate depreciation - - 0.00 -0.12
- - (0.14) (0.16)
govt. bond yield abroad 5.22* 4.67 0.88 2.11
(2.84) (3.04) (2.17) (2.05)
change in terms of trade -0.29 - - -
(0.34) - - -
lagged change in terms of trade - - 0.06 -
- - (0.19) -
change in oil prices - 0.01 - -
- (0.03) - -
lagged change in oil prices - - - -0.04**
- - - (0.02)
R Sq 0.71 0.74 0.85 0.87
Adj R Sq 0.67 0.71 0.83 0.85
Std. Error 3.98 3.75 2.88 2.67
Sum Squared Resid 759.55 674.81 398.15 342.52
J Stat 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
No. of Observations 55 55 55 55
*, ** and *** denote 10%, 5% and 1% significance respectively
Std. Errors in parentheses
1/ Instrument list includes lags of dependent variable, lags of observed inflation
    and lags of explanatory variables
Dependent Variable: nominal overnight interest rate 
 
 
Since the main idea is to explore whether there has been a change in the 
behavior of the central bank once the inflation target was adopted, the next step is to 
test for the presence of a structural break for equation (2), where the obvious candidate 
for such break corresponds to the date of the adoption of the explicit inflation target in 
January of 1999.  If there is a break around that time, estimations for different sub-
samples before and after should provide information about differences in the behavior 
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of the central bank given the announcement of the policy shift, and these differences 
should be reflected in the relative magnitude and significance of the regressors in 
expression (2) for each sub-sample.  However, one problem is that standard structural 
change tests require an a priori assumption about the time of occurrence of the 
structural break itself, and lead to ambiguous conclusions, as shown in Table 1.3.   
 
Table 1.3. Structural Change Tests  
for Mexico at January 1999 
 Test Stat Result 
Wald Test (unequal variance) (null: no structural change) 
 40.51* reject null 
Chow Breakpoint Test  
F-stat 8.28* reject null 
LL Ratio 57.29* reject null 
Chow Forecast Test  
F-stat 0.46403 cannot reject null 
LL Ratio 719.907 cannot reject null 
CUSUM test -- cannot reject null 
CUSUM Sq -- reject null 
* Denotes 5% significance level 
 
1.3.3.2.  Analysis of Multiple Endogenous Structural Changes. 
Given the official announcement of a policy shift in January 1999, one would 
expect to observe a de facto change in the behavior of the central bank associated to 
such announcement.  The problem is that the conventiona l structural change tests above 
do not provide conclusive evidence about the occurrence of a change in policy behavior 
exactly at that point.  In addition to the fact that these policy changes take time, it is 
possible that the central bank engaged in a transition period some time before the 
official announcement was made, particularly in face of the Asian and the Russian 
34 
crises of 1997 and 1998.  Alternatively, it may be that the policy shift occurred after the 
announcement was made, and that the announcement itself was only to set up the 
adequate conditions for the actual shift to generate best results.   It may then be argued 
that the de facto policy shift did not necessarily occur at the time of the announcement 
and the timing of the “true” change has to be estimated.  Moreover, it may be that the 
highly unstable environment around the second half of 1998 led the authorities to 
adjust differently and hence there has been more than one policy shift, particularly 
since towards the second half of 1999 the situation was much more stable than before.  
To explore these possibilities and estimate the time of a “true” policy shift, if any, 
expression (2) is tested for the presence of multiple structural changes using the 
procedure developed by Bai and Perron (1998, 2001).  One of the main benefits from 
the application of this procedure is that it endogenously estimates the number and the 
dates the structural breaks occurred rather than setting them exogenously, as it is the 
case for the conventional structural change tests presented above.   
The procedure works as follows.  Suppose there are T observations of a random 
variable wt and the goal is to estimate not only the first and second moments of w, but 
also whether these moments have changed over time, that is, if there have been any 
structural breaks in w.  The problem is that the total number of breaks that occurred (if 
any) and the dates these breaks occurred are ignored.  Therefore, there is a need not 
only to estimate if there have been any breaks, but the number of breaks that have 
occurred and the dates they occurred.  Suppose a priori that m breaks have occurred.  
This means that if indeed there are m breaks, then there will be m+1 different sub-
samples of T (regimes) for which one pair of first and second moments of w can be 
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estimated, along with the m dates for the breaks.  Given a prior on m, the first step is to 
define all the possible sets of m+1 different sub-samples (segments) of T that are at 
least of length h (set exogenously) for which the moments of w can be estimated.  
These sets of m+1 segments have to be contiguous but with no common observations, 
and can be of different lengths.  Then, the moments of w for all the defined sets of m+1 
segments are estimated using OLS, and the residuals of each set of m+1 segments are 
utilized to determine which is the best set of m+1 segments to minimize the LS 
function over the full sample.  Hence, the selected set of m+1 segments will be the one 
that minimizes the global sum of least squares, and will be the one that determines the 
estimated dates of the breaks.  Since the “true” m is unknown, the procedure is repeated 
for m=0 to M (M exogenously defines an upper bound for the number of breaks m), and 
the corresponding sets of square residuals selected under each m are compared to 
determine both the “true” number of breaks m and the dates the breaks occurred.  
Useful for my purposes is that Bai and Perron extend their analysis to a multiple 
regression model that allows for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity in the 
disturbances, for the inclusion of lags of the dependent variable, and for the 
introduction of restrictions on the number of parameters subject to change.44   
Bai and Perron also developed several F-tests for the results provided by the 
application of their method: a test for multiple breaks, known as SupFT(k), where the 
null hypothesis is that there are no breaks (m=0) against the alternative of k>0 
structural breaks for an exogenously given k; a “double maximum” test which allows 
for testing agains t an unknown number of breaks (for k not predetermined, but limited 
                                                 
44 For a highly detailed explanation of how this procedure works, see Bai and Perron (2001). 
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above by some number M), with test statistics known as UDMax and WDMax, both 
based on the global minimization of the sum of square residuals described; and a test 
denominated SupF(i+1,i) for i=1 to M, to test for the presence of additional breaks 
within each partition of T.  Finally, to select the dimension of the econometric model 
estimated, that is, to determine the number of breaks in the estimations, Bai and Perron 
borrow different information criteria that include the Bayesian Information Criterion 
(BIC) the Akaikie-Schwarz Information Criterion (AIC), a modified Schwarz Criterion 
(LWZ), and develop their own Sequential Procedure.45 
The general specification of equation (2) can be written exactly as in Bai and 
Perron (2001) as 
 
  Y = Xβ  + Zδ + U       (3) 
 
where Y is a column-vector of the dependent variable of  the form (T*1); X is a (T*p) 
matrix of regressors whose coefficients are not allowed to change (see below); Z is a 
(T*[q*(m+1)]) diagonal matrix of regressors whose coefficients are allowed to change; 
U is a column-vector (T*1) of disturbances; T is the total number of observations; m is 
the number of breaks; p is the number of coefficients in β  not allowed to change; and q 
is the number of coefficients in δ allowed to change.46   
                                                 
45 See Bai and Perron (2001) and references therein. 
46 T is partitioned into m+1 sub-sets, and these partitions define the sizes of the sub-matrices on the 
diagonal of Z, i.e., Z is a diagonal matrix where each element of its diagonal is a matrix Zi for i=1 to m+1 
of size (Ts*q) where SsTs=T, and all the off-diagonal elements are zero. 
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In the present case, in principle it is assumed that all the coefficients β i in 
expression (2) are allowed to change, so that the parameter vector β  in expression (3) is 
empty and the parameter vector δ=(β0, β1, …, β6)’, which means that p=0 and q=7.  It 
is also assumed that the maximum number of breaks M=5 and, as mentioned above, the 
estimations are robust to both autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity in the 
disturbances; the disturbances are allowed to be distributed differently across regimes 
as well.47   
The guidelines for the interpretation of the results are as follows.  First, the null 
hypothesis is of no structural breaks.  Second, to select for the number of breaks, the 
BIC criterion works well when breaks are present, but not under the null, especially if 
there is serial correlation.  Third, the LWZ criterion outperforms the BIC criterion 
under the null, but performs relatively poorly when breaks are present.  Also, model 
selection procedures based on information criteria cannot take into account potential 
heterogeneity across segments, unlike the Sequential Procedure.  Overall the Sequential 
Procedure works better, but it is not fully consistent in the presence of multiple breaks 
under some specifications (for instance, it is possible to reject 0 vs. 1 structural break, 
but not to reject the hypothesis of 0 vs. 2 structural breaks).  In that case, however, one 
can use the UDMax or WDMax tests for the presence of at least one break.  If these 
statistics indicate the presence of at least one break, then the final number of breaks can 
be decided based upon the SupF(i+1,i) tests from global minimums (the number of 
breaks will be that for which the corresponding SupF( ) statistics are significant).  
                                                 
47 Bai and Perron suggest M=5 to be a plausible number for most empirical applications.  Also, given the 
situation described in Mexico this appears to be a reasonable assumption. 
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Finally, in general non-symmetric confidence intervals (ci) for T are better in the sense 
that they contain the true value of the changes (if any) whenever the data are non-
stationary.  The coverage dates (from the ci’s) are adequate unless the breaks are too 
large or too small. 
Table 1.4A presents the results from estimating expression (2) using Bai and 
Perron’s procedure allowing all the coefficients to change across regimes.48  Following 
the guidelines outlined above, the number and timing of the breaks can be determined 
as follows.  First, the SupFT(k) tests indicate that all 5 structural breaks are statistically 
significant, and both the UDMax and WDMax tests are also significant.  Therefore, it is 
safe to conclude in favor of at least one structural break, supported also by the 
SupF(i+1,i) tests, which are significant for i=1 and i=2.  Second, the Sequential 
Procedure identifies only one structural break on September of 1998 at the 5 percent 
significance level, which is fully consistent with the global optimization results 
obtained (not shown).  Third, there is evidence of two structural breaks as indicated by 
the BIC criterion while the LWZ criterion indicates no structural changes, which 
supports the idea that the latter performs relatively poorly when breaks are present.   
                                                 
48 I tested for structural breaks with other specifications like those in Table 1.1 and Table 1.2 (not 
presented but available upon request) with fairly similar results.   
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Table 1.4A. Endogenous Structural Change Tests  
for Mexico Using Monthly Data 
(all coefficients allowed to change, i.e. , p=0, q=7) 
Set of regressors: RHS of Equation (2)  
Max number of breaks allowed (M): 5  
SupFT(k) test for (fixed) number of structural breaks  
k=1 k=2 k=3 k=4 k=5 UDMax1/ WDMax1/ 
50.68* 47.28* 62.32* 118.95* 724.14* 724.14* 1181.86* 
SupF(i+1,i) test for i vs. i+1 structural breaks 
i=1 i=2 i=3 i=4 i=5 
22.10* 24.36* 2.85 - -  
 Number of breaks selected 
Sequential Procedure  1* 
LWZ Criterion 0 
BIC Criterion 2  
 Estimated dates2/  
1̂T  2̂T  3̂T  4̂T  5̂T  
5/98 9/98** 8/99 12/00 - 
 (3/98-6/98) (7/98-4/99) (8/99-12/99) (10/00-1/01) -  
1/ UDMax and WDMax tests for unknown number of structural breaks. 
2/ Intervals reported are significant at 5% level. 
* Indicates 5% significance level. 
** Selected estimated break(s). 
 
Overall, evidence favors the presence of one structural break as indicated by the 
sequential procedure, since neither the BIC nor the LWZ criteria are robust to 
heterogeneity across regimes and the latter also performs relatively poorly when breaks 
are present.  The break selected will therefore correspond to September of 1998.  The 
confidence interval for that break goes from July of 1998 to April of 1999 as indicated 
in Table 1.4A, so that it includes the date of the adoption of the explicit inflation target 
in January of 1999.  By looking at Figure 1.2 at the beginning of Section 3, the rebound 
of the exchange rate depreciation observed since October of 1996 lies exactly within 
this interval, which itself corresponds to the highly turbulent situation that prevailed in 
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international markets due to the Russian crisis in 1998.  Also, Figure 1.4 shows the 
behavior of the instrument rate for the full sample, and it is exactly during the interval 
obtained when the interest rate reaches its highest overall levels.   
 







































































































































The results from undertaking Bai and Perron’s test not allowing the coefficient 
for the lagged dependent variable to change across regimes are presented in Table 
1.4B.  The evidence there points toward four to five breaks according to the sequential 
procedure.49  It is interesting to notice that the interval for the break identified 
previously is somehow decomposed into two separate breaks in this case, 
                                                 
49 At the 10 percent significance five breaks are identified whereas at the 1 percent significance there are 
only four breaks.   
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corresponding precisely to August of 1998 and May of 1999 separately.  This may be 
an indication that the central bank of Mexico was initially forced to impose a stringent 
monetary policy to counterbalance the pressure from abroad, not only on the exchange 
rate but on the price level as well.50  In the end, the high volatility that characterized the 
second half of 1998 most likely pushed the monetary authority to shift its policy rule 
towards the adoption of the explicit inflation target at the beginning of 1999.   
 
Table 1.4B. Endogenous Structural Change Tests  
for Mexico Using Monthly Data 
(lagged dep. var. not allowed to change, i.e., p=1, q=6) 
Set of regressors: RHS of Equation (2) 
except lagged dep. var.  
Max number of breaks allowed (M): 5  
SupFT(k) test for (fixed) number of structural breaks  
k=1 k=2 k=3 k=4 k=5 UDMax1/ WDMax1/ 
62.87* 131.65* 111.53* 575.49* 716.74* 716.74* 1205.38* 
SupF(i+1,i) test for i vs. i+1 structural breaks 
i=1 i=2 i=3 i=4 i=5 
212.00* 90.02* 2.54 - -  
 Number of breaks selected 
Sequential Procedure 4-5* 
LWZ Procedure 0 
BIC Procedure 3  
 Estimated dates2/  
1̂T  2̂T  3̂T  4̂T  5̂T  
8/98** 5/99** 1/00** 1/01** - 
 (6/98-9/98) (3/99-6/99) (11/99-3/00) (11/00-2/01) -  
1/ UDMax and WDMax tests for unknown number of structural breaks. 
2/ Intervals reported are significant at 5% level. 
* Indicates 5% significance level (see footnote 40). 
** Selected estimated break(s). 
 
                                                 
50 With the exception of September 1998, there were no direct interventions on the foreign exchange 
market by the central bank to offset capital outflows and the corresponding depreciation of the peso.   
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Based on these results, there are at least two plausible sub-samples that should 
be taken for consideration: one from May 1996 to June 1998, and another from May 
1999 to December 2001.  A sensible analysis is to compare the results for the full 
sample (May 1995 to December 2001) shown in Tables 1.1 and 1.2 with the results 
obtained for the samples starting on September 1998, and on May 1999, dates 
associated to structural breaks.51  This comparison is presented on Table 1.5.  The first 
three columns show the OLS estimations with NW standard errors corresponding to 
those in column (a) of both Table 1.1 and Table 1.2.  The last three columns show the 
same estimations using GMM estimations.   
 
Table 1.5. Full Sample and Suggested Sub-samples 
for Mexico Using Monthly Data (OLS and GMM Estimations) 
full sample 10/98-12/01 5/99-12/01 full sample 10/98-12/01 5/99-12/01
constant -13.57** -14.07*** -14.29** -41.85* -20.80** -24.41***
(5.30) (5.09) (4.95) (23.04) (8.59) (7.41)
lagged nominal overnight interest rate 0.49*** 0.57*** 0.67*** 0.28 0.49*** 0.49***
(0.10) (0.09) (0.08) (0.25) (0.14) (0.10)
expected - announced inflation 3.34*** 2.69*** 1.22 2.79 2.84** 1.82**
(0.86) (0.98) (0.85) (2.02) (1.17) (0.87)
output gap (sa) 0.50*** 0.43*** 0.33*** 0.53** 0.56*** 0.50***
(0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.26) (0.16) (0.10)
exchange rate depreciation 0.52*** 0.34** 0.23 1.32** 0.09 0.05
(0.13) (0.15) (0.14) (0.61) (0.31) (0.29)
govt. bond yield abroad 1.85*** 1.81*** 1.86*** 5.22* 2.63** 3.14***
(0.61) (0.60) (0.56) (2.84) (1.07) (0.88)
change in terms of trade -0.44*** -0.25** -0.13 -0.29 -0.34 -0.25
(0.15) (0.13) (0.16) (0.34) (0.14) (0.14)
R Sq 0.93 0.96 0.91 0.71 0.95 0.90
Adj R Sq 0.92 0.95 0.89 0.67 0.94 0.88
Std. Error 1.99 1.63 1.38 3.98 1.71 1.49
Sum Squared Resid 193.90 84.96 47.74 759.55 93.88 55.22
F Stat 102.15 114.83 44.83 - - -
Prob 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 - - -
J Stat - - - 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
No. of Observations 56 39 32 55 39 32
1/ Instrument list includes lags of dependent variable, lags of observed inflation and lags of explanatory variables
*, ** and *** denote 10%, 5% and 1% significance respectively
Std. Errors in parentheses
OLS with NW standard errors GMM estimation 1/
Dependent Variable. nominal overnight interest rate
 
                                                 
51 This is because there are no available series for inflation expectations before May of 1996, and the 
nature of the estimation would require lagged information about them.   
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With respect to OLS with NW standard errors (the first three columns of Table 
1.5) there are several interesting results.  First, it appears to be some degree of interest 
rate smoothing in both sub-samples, as the coefficient for the lagged interest rate 
remains between 0 and 1 and is significant in both cases.  Second, a somewhat 
disappointing result is that the “credibility gap” loses explanatory power in the second 
sub-sample.  One would expect the credibility gap to become more relevant for 
monetary policy whenever the inflation target is in operation, relative to the case when 
it is not.  On the other hand, one might explain this result through the idea that the 
central bank has followed a more flexible inflation target as inflation has diminished 
over time (see Figure 1.2 above).52  Third, the coefficient for the output gap is positive 
and remains significant across sub-samples, which is consistent with the theoretical 
literature on monetary policy behavior, and suggests a stabilizing monetary policy (note 
that even though the coefficient falls, its implied long run va lue remains around 1).  
Fourth, the exchange rate coefficient falls monotonically and ends up becoming 
statistically insignificant for the sub-sample starting from May 1999, five months after 
the adoption of the inflation target.  The occurrence of the Russian crisis and the 
exchange rate volatility it generated may to a good extent explain the significance of 
this variable for the second sub-sample.  The higher stability observed since the 
beginning of 1999 may also explain that the exchange rate is not significant for the 
third sub-sample.  This issue should be taken carefully since, even though the exchange 
                                                 
52 I would like to thank Alberto Torres for this observation. 
44 
rate volatility has indeed fallen over time,53 it is hard to determine ex ante if this is a 
cause or a consequence of the policy shift, and this brings about the need to take into 
account endogeneity issues through the use of GMM estimations.  Ultimately, the fact 
that the exchange rate variable is significant for the first sub-sample but not for the 
second brings about Svensson’s point regarding the conditions for inflation targeting to 
be successful, which include exchange rate flexibility.  At the same time, the non-
significance of the changes in the exchange rate after May 1999 points toward the idea 
that fear of floating may be a transitional phenomenon.   
The last three columns of Table 1.5 show the results using GMM estimations.  
These estimations also show that the central bank engaged in some degree of interest 
rate smoothing towards the adoption of the inflation target, even though the lagged 
dependent variable is not significant for the full sample.  With respect to the coefficient 
of the “credibility gap” the story is more appealing than that from OLS; this variable 
gains explanatory power after the structural break.  This result supports the belief that 
this indicator becomes more relevant for monetary policy once the explicit inflation 
target is adopted, even though the coefficient is somewhat smaller and does not change 
monotonically in any particular direction.  Again, as pointed out above, the fact that the 
coefficient associated to the inflation gap is smaller for the second sub-sample may be 
explained along the lines of a less strict inflation targeting towards the end of the 
sample where inflation was much lower than previously, which makes the results from 
both methods quite consistent.   
                                                 
53 See Werner (2001). 
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The coefficient of the output gap from GMM is always significant, but 
relatively more stable than from OLS.  Even though it reaches its lowest value for the 
second sub-sample (after the adoption of the inflation target), the implied long run 
coefficient remains practically equal to 1.  But one of the most striking results is 
perhaps that the coefficient of the exchange rate depreciation rate falls heavily and 
loses explanatory power even after the first break, that is, regardless of the Russian 
crisis and its effects during 1998.  These results allow to further suspect that fear of 
floating was a temporary phenomenon for the Mexican experience.54   
There is an additional matter that deserves some attention.  The variables 
included in the estimations presented here tend to follow a trend over time, and the fact 
that the R-squared statistics obtained in the estimations presented above are relatively 
optimistic supports this idea, particularly given the inclusion of the lagged dependent 
variable as a repressor.  For this purpose, equation (2) is estimated under the 
assumption that all variables are of the same order of integration, that is, they are all 
stationary. 55  This implies that, aside from the exchange rate depreciation, the change in 
terms of trade, and the UMS26 rate, the rest of the variables are expressed in first 
differences to ensure stationarity. 56  By splitting the sample along the same lines as 
                                                 
54 It has been argued that exchange rate volatility diminished significantly during the second half of 
1999.  The measured volatility indeed fell relative to that prior to January of 1999.  However, there is no 
significant difference in the behavior of the exchange rate before the second half of 1998 and after May 
of 1999 (see Appendix 3).  This point becomes relevant below when daily data are considered for similar 
exercises.    
55 I would like to thank Michael Binder for this suggestion. 
56 See Appendix 1. 
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before, the results continue to support the idea of a change in the behavior of the 
monetary authority towards the end of 1998, as shown in Table 1.6.57   
 
Table 1.6. Regression in First Differences for  




D(expected - announced inflation) 2.94*** 1.08
(0.96) (1.51)
D(output gap) (sa) -0.23 -0.29*
(0.30) (0.16)
exchange rate depreciation 0.66*** 0.38**
(0.22) (0.14)
govt. bond yield abroad 0.08 0.45
(0.46) (0.53)
change in terms of trade -0.14 0.00
(0.21) (0.19)
R Sq 0.51 0.33
Adj R Sq 0.47 0.20
Std. Error 2.47 1.52
Sum Squared Resid 298.75 59.82
F Stat 10.39 2.56
Prob 0.0000 0.0515
No. of Observations 55 32
*, ** and *** denote 10%, 5% and 1% significance respectively
Std. Errors in parentheses
Dependent Variable: D(nominal overnight interest rate)
OLS with Newey-West standard errors
 
 
1.3.3.3.  Further Analysis of The Mexican Case: Estimations Using Daily Data. 
In order to take advantage of the higher frequency data available (the interest 
rate, the exchange rate, the UMS26 rate, and the oil prices, which are available daily, 
and the figures for inflation expectations, which are available biweekly), I combine the 
high frequency data with lower frequency series by constructing simple approximations 
(linear interpolations) between the lower frequency observations, and then repeat the 
                                                 
57 The problem is the limited availability of data and the information loss associated with this 
specification.  Structural change tests for this specification are available upon request.   
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exercises to further explore the possibility of a change in Mexico’s monetary 
authority’s behavior towards the end of 1998.58     
The first step is to repeat the estimations for the full sample (from May 5, 1996 
to December 31, 2001) using daily data.  The second step is to test for structural breaks 
and contrast the corresponding sub-sample estimations derived with those from 
monthly data.  The main advantage here is that it is econometrically feasible to estimate 
a separate sub-sample prior to August 1998 if a break is found.  Finally, in order to 
account for the robustness of the changes found, some alternative specifications are 
considered.  Among these alternative specifications, the credibility gap is substituted 
with what is called performance, which is the difference between observed inflation 
and the corresponding inflation target, exactly as in Taylor (1998).  The use of lagged 
observed inflation is explored as well.59   
The first column of Table 1.7 replicates the estimation presented in column (b) 
of Table 1.1 but using daily instead of monthly data.  The signs and the significance of 
the coefficients here are almost identical to their monthly counterparts, but not their 
magnitudes.  The problem is that the results using daily data suggests the presence of a 
                                                 
58 For example, to proxy for the output gap, I assume that the rate of growth of industrial production is 
constant within a month, and the daily unobserved data between monthly existing observations are filled 
up with the implied calculations.  For the case of inflation expectations, which are available biweekly, I 
assume that individuals revise their expectations daily at a constant rate.  Therefore the corresponding 
unobserved series is created also using linear interpolations.  The variables affected by this procedure 
relative to low frequency data are the credibility gap and the output gap; the oil prices for the Mexican 
mix available daily are used instead of the terms of trade available monthly. 
59 I wish to thank Fernando Broner and John Shea for suggesting these alternative exercises. 
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unit root; both the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable and the R-squared are 
practically 1.  Also, it can be argued that there is a strong degree of simultaneity 
between the instrument variable and some of the regressors, and between some 
regressors themselves, particularly the rate of change of the exchange rate and the 
country risk variable.  To partially address these problems, in column (b) of Table 1.7 
the lagged dependent variable on the right-hand side, the exchange rate and the oil 
price regressors correspond to monthly rather than daily lags.60  These results are 
qualitatively very similar to those in column (d) of Table 1.1, since in both cases the 
signs are identical and the only variable that is not significant is the lagged exchange 
rate depreciation which also has the wrong sign.  Column (c) in Table 1.7 shows the 
results excluding the lagged dependent variable.  The significance of all the coefficients 
relative to those in column (b) remains unchanged, but the exclusion of the lagged 
dependent variable seems to induce an upward bias in the remaining variables except 
the oil price changes.  This probably reflects that observed interest rates affect inflation 
expectations and the output gap and partially illustrates the need for the use of the 
GMM method discussed above.  The remaining two columns show alternative 
specifications for expression (2): column (d) includes the lagged observed inflation as 
an explanatory variable, while column (e) replaces the credibility gap with the 
difference between observed and announced inflation, labeled as performance.  It is 
somewhat surprising that inflation lags remain significant since one would expect this 
variable to be included in inflation expectations without necessarily contradicting the 
                                                 
60 It corresponds to the previous monthly average.  This is why I explore the alternative specifications of 
equation (2) presented in Table 1.7.   
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assumption that they are constructed rationally.  The significance of the performance 
variable allows to test for the robustness of the remaining variables.  Notice that in both 
cases the output gap is positive and significant as well as for the case of the government 
bond yield and the oil price change.  An interesting result is that the lagged exchange 
rate is not significant in any specifications and it is negative in two of them.   
 
Table 1.7. OLS with NW Std. Errors for the  
Full Sample Using Daily Data for Mexico 
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
constant -1.52*** -24.35*** -22.46*** -21.77*** -16.34***
(0.58) (3.19) (3.60) (3.23) (3.76)
lagged nominal overnight interest rate 0.95*** 0.56*** - 0.43*** 0.57***
(0.01) (0.05) - (0.06) (0.07)
lagged observed inflation - - - 0.17*** -
- - - (0.03) -
expected - announced inflation 0.30*** 1.88*** 5.83*** 2.53*** -
(0.08) (0.37) (0.40) (0.37) -
performance - - - - 0.28***
- - - - (0.09)
output gap (sa) 0.05*** 0.46*** 0.75*** 0.52*** 0.20**
(0.01) (0.07) (0.10) (0.07) (0.08)
exchange rate depreciation 0.04*** - - - -
(0.01) - - - -
lagged exchange rate depreciation - -0.05 0.1 -0.01 0.07
- (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06)
govt. bond yield abroad 0.21*** 3.07*** 3.36*** 2.71*** 2.44***
(0.07) (0.39) (0.41) (0.39) (0.47)
change in oil prices -0.00 - - - -
(0.00) - - - -
lagged change in oil prices - -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.05*** -0.03***
- (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) -0.01
R Sq 0.99 0.92 0.84 0.93 0.88
Adj R Sq 0.99 0.92 0.84 0.93 0.88
Std. Error 0.70 1.85 2.60 1.77 2.40
Sum Squared Resid 588.77 4061.19 8061.50 3740.72 8368.33
F Stat 17252.00 2331.52 1292.46 2182.38 1707.92
Prob 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
No. of Observations 1197 1197 1197 1197 1458
*, ** and *** denote 10%, 5% and 1% significance respectively
Std. Errors in parentheses




The results using GMM presented in Table 1.8 are practically identical to those 
using OLS.  The only difference is that for specification (a) the exchange rate 
depreciation is not significant using GMM as opposed to OLS where it is.  The fact that 
excluding the lagged dependent variable clearly introduces an upward bias in other 
regressors (as shown in column (c)), that there are some issues of endogeneity of the 
exchange rate, and that the performance variable is backward looking, specifications 
(b) and (d) seem to be plausible for the present purposes.61 
                                                 
61 An additional exercise separating the inflation gap into expected and announced inflation, and 
including lagged observed inflation was undertaken as well.  See Appendix 1. 
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Table 1.8. GMM Estimations  for the 
Full Sample Using Daily Data for Mexico1/ 
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
constant -1.54** -25.52*** -23.75*** -22.95*** -16.75***
(0.63) (3.36) (3.58) (3.41) (3.90)
lagged nominal overnight interest rate 0.96*** 0.56*** - 0.44*** 0.57***
(0.01) (0.05) - (0.06) (0.07)
lagged observed inflation - - - 0.16*** -
- - - (0.04) -
expected - announced inflation 0.23*** 1.77*** 5.73*** 2.42*** -
(0.07) (0.36) (0.40) (0.38) -
performance - - - - 0.27***
- - - - (0.09)
output gap (sa) 0.04*** 0.45*** 0.75*** 0.51*** 0.20**
(0.01) (0.07) (0.10) (0.07) (0.08)
exchange rate depreciation 0.01 - - - -
(0.01) - - - -
lagged exchange rate depreciation - -0.07 0.09 -0.03 0.05
- (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07)
govt. bond yield abroad 0.21*** 3.20*** 3.51*** 2.85*** 2.48***
(0.08) (0.41) (0.41) (0.41) (0.48)
change in oil prices -0.00 - - - -
(0.00) - - - -
lagged change in oil prices - -0.05*** -0.04*** -0.05*** -0.03***
- (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (-0.01)
R Sq 0.99 0.92 0.84 0.93 0.88
Adj R Sq 0.99 0.92 0.84 0.93 0.88
Std. Error 0.71 1.85 2.60 1.77 2.40
Sum Squared Resid 595.69 4065.51 8064.20 3738.12 8355.91
J Stat 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
No. of Observations 1196 1196 1196 1196 1457
1/ Instrument list includes lags of dependent variable, lags of observed inflation and lags of explanatory variables
*, ** and *** denote 10%, 5% and 1% significance respectively
Std. Errors in parentheses
Dependent Variable: nominal overnight interest rate 
 
 
1.3.3.4.  Multiple Endogenous Structural Changes and Sub-sample Results. 
As for the case of monthly data, the natural step to test for the presence of 
structural breaks.  All the specifications shown in Table 1.7 (and Table 1.8) were 
subject to Bai and Perron’s procedure.62  The results with respect to the occurrence of 
structural breaks remain practically unchanged relative to those obtained for the case of 
                                                 
62 See Appendix 2: Table A2.1 through Table A2.8. 
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monthly data presented in Table 1.4A and Table 1.4B previously.  For the case where 
all the coefficients of equation (2) are allowed to change, there is evidence of only one 
structural break according to the sequential method at the five percent significance 
level, which corresponds to September 22 of 1998.  The confidence interval goes from 
September 15, 1998 to April 27, 1999, fairly similar to the results using monthly data.  
This is interesting because the change is identified at the time where exchange rate 
volatility was relatively high in light of the Russian in August 1998.  Whenever the 
lagged dependent variable is not allowed to change, three breaks are identified, which 
correspond to the beginning of June 1998, the beginning of February 1999, and the 
beginning of April 2001.   
With the use of monthly rather than daily lags for the dependent variable on the 
right-hand side of equation (2) four breaks are identified, both when this coefficient is 
allowed to change across regimes and when it is not.  These breaks correspond to the 
beginning of June 1998, the beginning of February 1999, mid November 1999, and mid 
November 2000, all consistent with the confidence intervals of the breaks identified in 
Table 1.4B above.  The tests that correspond to column (e) support the presence of four 
breaks for OLS and three for GMM, also occurring within the vicinity of the previous 
ones.  The structural break tests for the rest of the specifications of Table 1.7 and Table 
1.8 provide similar results.  What is key for my purposes is that in all cases one break is 
identified to occur some time around the third quarter of 1998, while another is 
identified to occur some time within the first five months of 1999 (see below).   
Following the exercises using monthly data, the next step is to estimate the 
alternative specifications in Table 1.8 for expression (2) for different sub-samples as 
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indicated by the application of Bai and Perron’s procedure.  In principle, two sub-
samples are explored: from May 5, 1996 to the end of July 1998 (to exclude the high 
volatility episode generated by the Russian crisis in August of that year); and from May 
1999 to December 2001.63  Tables 1.9 through 1.11 repeat the GMM estimation results 
that correspond to those in columns (b), (d) and (e) of Table 1.8 for the full sample, and 
their respective before and after sub-samples.64  The idea is precisely to illustrate the 
changes in the magnitude and explanatory power of the variables to infer any possible 
changes in the behavior of the central bank.  As mentioned previously, the credibility 
gap and the output gap constitute the core variables for monetary policy, standard in the 
literature about policy rules (the conventional variables, while the rest of the variables 
may account for external factors possibly relevant in small open economies.  It is worth 
mentioning that the country risk variable is relevant in these economies to the extent 
that they are dependent on foreign capital.  The better the perception of the markets 
abroad, the more likely for capital to enter these countries.  This may affect monetary 
policy both directly (that is precisely the rationale for the inclusion of this variable 
explicitly in (2) above) and indirectly through exchange rate changes (the rationale for 
using GMM estimations).   
                                                 
63 It will also be interesting to explore the behavior of the coefficients of equation (2) exactly in the 
period of highest turbulence, that is, between the Asian crisis and the beginning of 1999.  Another 
interesting exercise would be to study the behavior of this specification towards the end of the year 2000, 
which is where the last break has been identified.   
64 Analogous results using Newey-West standard errors are also available upon request.  The results are 
practically identical to those presented here.  Exercises using the real ex ante interest rate as the 
dependent variable were also undertaken with strikingly similar results (also available upon request). 
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Table 1.9 shows the results (using daily data) for the full sample and the 
selected sub-samples for specification in (b) of Table 1.8.  It is interesting that the lag 
of the dependent variable is not significant before the adoption of the target, which may 
suggest that interest rate smoothing was not a priority at the time.  The coefficient of 
the credibility gap remains very stable across samples, increasing only slightly and 
perhaps not significantly.  The coefficient for the output gap falls for the second sub-
sample to less than one half of its value during the first one, but it is statistically 
significant in both.  A more stable macroeconomic environment could explain this 
result, but the behavior of the output gap rejects this conjecture.  Instead, the fact that 
output was above its potential level (see Appendix 3) for the second sub-sample should 
suggest that the central bank would respond more strongly to this variable.  A third 
possibility is that the central bank was more strict in terms of the applicability of 
inflation targeting and was more willing to “accommodate” changes in the output gap 
(relative to the inflation gap).  The lagged exchange rate depreciation rate is strongly 
significant in the first sub-sample (recall that this is not explained by external volatility 
since the Russian crisis is excluded) but it clearly loses significance for the second part, 
i.e., after the adoption of the target.  A similar pattern is observed for the oil price 
inflation.  Finally, it is worth noting that the government bond yield abroad (the country 
risk variable) is significant in both sub-samples.  This clearly suggests that the 
perception that investors have about the country is relevant for monetary policy.   
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Table 1.9. GMM Estimations  for the Full Sample  
and Selected Sub-samples Using Daily Data for Mexico1/ 
(specification in (b) of Table 1.8) 
Full Sample Before After
constant -25.52*** -2.51 -13.57***
(3.36) (3.49) (2.38)
lagged nominal overnight interest rate 0.56*** -0.10 0.67***
(0.05) (0.08) (0.05)
expected - announced inflation 1.77*** 1.34*** 1.36***
(0.36) (0.28) (0.41)
output gap (sa) 0.45*** 0.99*** 0.40***
(0.07) (0.23) (0.07)
lagged exchange rate depreciation -0.07 0.13*** -0.08
(0.05) (0.04) (0.06)
govt. bond yield abroad 3.20*** 2.33*** 1.75***
(0.41) (0.32) (0.28)
lagged change in oil prices -0.05*** -0.04*** -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
R Sq 0.92 0.64 0.92
Adj R Sq 0.92 0.64 0.92
Std. Error 1.85 1.07 1.19
Sum Squared Resid 4065.51 360.53 975.27
J Stat 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
No. of Observations 1196 304 694
1/ Instrument list includes lags of dependent variable, lags of observed inflation
and lags of explanatory variables
*, ** and *** denote 10%, 5% and 1% significance respectively
Std. Errors in parentheses
Dependent Variable: nominal overnight interest rate 
 
 
Since the specification in (c) of Table 1.8 shows the bias introduced by 
excluding the lagged dependent variable as a regressor, there is no further analysis of 
the corresponding sub-samples.  Instead, Table 1.10 shows the results for the full 
sample and the selected sub-samples for specification in (d) of Table 1.8, where lagged 
observed inflation is included as an explanatory variable.   
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Table 1.10. GMM Estimations  for the Full Sample  
and Selected Sub-samples Using Daily Data for Mexico1/ 
(specification in (d) of Table 1.8) 
Full Sample Before After
constant -22.95*** 4.88 -11.08***
(3.41) (4.54) (3.37)
lagged nominal overnight interest rate 0.44*** -0.12 0.63***
(0.06) (0.09) (0.06)
lagged observed inflation 0.16*** 0.01 0.07
(0.04) (0.06) (0.06)
expected - announced inflation 2.42*** 1.18*** 1.42***
(0.38) (0.30) (0.42)
output gap (sa) 0.51*** 0.93*** 0.42***
(0.07) (0.22) (0.07)
lagged exchange rate depreciation -0.03 0.16*** -0.07
(0.05) (0.04) (0.06)
govt. bond yield abroad 2.85*** 1.61*** 1.46***
(0.41) (0.42) (0.39)
lagged change in oil prices -0.05*** -0.03*** -0.01*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
R Sq 0.93 0.40 0.92
Adj R Sq 0.93 0.39 0.92
Std. Error 1.77 1.00 1.18
Sum Squared Resid 3738.12 295.41 960.30
J Stat 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
No. of Observations 1196 304 694
1/ Instrument list includes lags of dependent variable, lags of observed inflation
and lags of explanatory variables
*, ** and *** denote 10%, 5% and 1% significance respectively
Std. Errors in parentheses
Dependent Variable: nominal overnight interest rate 
 
 
Qualitatively, the results in Table 1.9 are very similar to those in Table 1.10.  
Notice that, as for the first case, the lagged dependent variable is significant only after 
the adoption of the inflation target.  Also, despite the fact that lagged inflation is 
significant for the full sample, it is not so for any of the two sub-samples.  The 
coefficient for credibility gap is significant in both sub-samples and it also tends to be 
higher for the second, supporting the idea of a more strict regime for that period.  The 
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output gap is significant in both sub-samples as well.  The reduction in the point 
estimate also points toward the conjecture of more strict inflation targeting after its 
adoption in 1999.  The loss of significance of the rate of change in the exchange rate 
allows to speculate about the transitory nature of fear of floating in Mexico.  The 
remaining two variables observe similar results to those in Table 1.9 with the exception 
that the oil price inflation is (marginally) significant for the second sub-sample in the 
specification of Table 1.10. 
Table 1.11 corresponds to specification (e) of Table 1.8.  Instead of using the 
credibility gap, the performance variable is utilized as a regressor (clearly this implies 
that the lagged observed inflation has to be excluded from the estimation).  The reason 
is, as explained, to test for the robustness of other variables through avoiding the 
endogeneity of inflation expectations embedded in the inflation gap measure.  In this 
case the lagged interest rate is significant in both sub-samples, but the coefficient for 
the first is less than one fourth of the coefficient for the second and this difference is 
statistically significant.  The fact that the performance variable loses significance for 
the second sub-sample is consistent with the result for lagged observed inflation in 
Table 1.10, suggesting that the nature of the policy rule for Mexico is forward rather 
than backward looking.  The rest of the results are qualitatively the same as those from 
the previous specifications, except for the oil price inflation, which is not significant for 
any sub-sample.   
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Table 1.11. GMM Estimations  for the Full Sample  
and Selected Sub-samples Using Daily Data for Mexico1/ 
(specification in (e) of Table 1.8) 
Full Sample Before After
constant -16.75*** -10.83*** -11.76***
(3.90) (2.28) (3.84)
lagged nominal overnight interest rate 0.57*** 0.16** 0.77***
(0.07) (0.08) (0.04)
performance 0.27*** 0.30*** 0.11
(0.09) (0.10) (0.10)
output gap (sa) 0.20** 0.87** 0.30***
(0.08) (0.36) (0.07)
lagged exchange rate depreciation 0.05 0.41*** -0.10
(0.07) (0.08) (0.06)
govt. bond yield abroad 2.48*** 2.77*** 1.57***
(0.48) (0.35) (0.41)
lagged change in oil prices -0.03*** -0.00 -0.01
(-0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
R Sq 0.88 0.80 0.91
Adj R Sq 0.88 0.80 0.91
Std. Error 2.40 1.97 1.23
Sum Squared Resid 8355.91 2155.11 1041.69
J Stat 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
No. of Observations 1457 565 694
1/ Instrument list includes lags of dependent variable, lags of observed inflation
and lags of explanatory variables
*, ** and *** denote 10%, 5% and 1% significance respectively
Std. Errors in parentheses
Dependent Variable: nominal overnight interest rate 
 
 
Overall, the results can be summarized as follows.  First, the inflation gap has 
gained importance for monetary policy in Mexico after the adoption of an explicit 
inflation target relative to other policy variables.  Second, the output gap has remained 
relevant for monetary policy before and after 1999, but the fall in the coefficient 
supports the idea of more strict inflation targeting after that year.  Third, the rate of 
change of the exchange rate has lost importance for the central bank of Mexico after 
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1999.  This suggests that the fear of floating phenomenon is temporary or rather 
transitional, and there is a movement toward greater exchange rate flexibility once the 
inflation target is in operation. 65,66  Fourth, the government bond yield abroad remains 
significant both before and after the break, suggesting that country risk factors are 
taken into account as well.  Finally, the terms of trade variable tends to be less relevant 
after 1999.   
The idea that the fear of floating phenomenon is temporary and the highly 
volatile environment experienced in Mexico during the second half of 1998 allows to 
believe that there may be a non- linearity in the reaction function of the central bank.  In 
extremely difficult times, it is possible that the monetary authority engages in some sort 
of signaling game where it uses the interest rate to stabilize the foreign exchange 
market.  A simple approach to test for the presence of a non-linearity would be to 
include a quadratic term of exchange rate depreciation as a regressor.  Instead I 
estimate (2) using a dummy variable to distinguish the before and the after periods 
interactive with the exchange rate depreciation. 67  Table 1.12 shows that the interactive 
term is negative and significant, indicating the presence of this non- linearity. 
                                                 
65 Alternatively, this may suggest that monetary policy instrumentation took into account some sort of 
monetary conditions index along the lines of Ball (1999). 
66 It may be argued that this is nothing but a result that the exchange rate not only has been more stable 
since 1999, but its rate of depreciation has diminished as well (see previous discussion for the monthly 
data).  Despite the fact that there is a difference in the volatility of the exchange rate depreciation rate 
over time, it appears to be stationary (see Appendix 1 and Appendix 3).   
67 This variable (dummy target) takes values of 1 under inflation targeting and zero otherwise (consistent 
with the structural change results). 
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Table 1.12. GMM Estimations  for the Full Sample 
Using Daily Data for Mexico1/ 
(testing for non-linearity) 
constant -25.33***
(3.46)
lagged nominal overnight interest rate 0.57***
(0.06)
expected - announced inflation 1.71***
(0.36)
output gap (sa) 0.44***
(0.07)
lagged exchange rate depreciation 0.02
(0.05)
lagged exch. rate dep.  * dummy target -0.24**
(0.10)
govt. bond yield abroad 3.17***
(0.43)
lagged change in oil prices -0.04***
(0.01)
R Sq 0.92
Adj R Sq 0.92
Std. Error 1.84
Sum Squared Resid 4010.04
J Stat 0.0008
No. of Observations 1196
1/ Instrument list includes lags of dependent variable, 
lags of observed inflation and lags of explanatory variables
*, ** and *** denote 10%, 5% and 1% significance respectively
Std. Errors in parentheses
Dependent Variable: nominal overnight interest rate 
 
 
An alternative approach is to estimate (2) for the highly volatile episode after 
the Asian crisis in 1997.  Table 1.13 shows the results from estimating (2) from the 
beginning of January to the end of October of 1998.  The exchange rate heavily 
explains the instrument variable, since the coefficient not only is significant at the 1 
percent level but it’s among the highest for the estimated sub-samples.  At the same 
time, the credibility variable is not significant, and the coefficient for the output gap is 
61 
also among the highest.  Clearly, the idea of a non linearity should be explored in more 
detail in order to understand this phenomenon and the results obtained.   
 
Table 1.13. GMM Estimations  between  
January and October of 1998 
Using Daily Data for Mexico1/ 
(testing for non-linearity) 
constant -33.86***
(3.25)
lagged nominal overnight interest rate 0.31***
(0.06)
expected - announced inflation -0.25
(0.80)
output gap (sa) 1.48***
(0.25)
lagged exchange rate depreciation 0.32***
(0.11)
govt. bond yield abroad 5.00***
(0.44)
lagged change in oil prices -0.03***
(0.01)
R Sq 0.93
Adj R Sq 0.93
Std. Error 1.74
Sum Squared Resid 633.59
J Stat 0.0000
No. of Observations 217
1/ Instrument list includes lags of dependent variable, 
lags of observed inflation and lags of explanatory variables
*, ** and *** denote 10%, 5% and 1% significance respectively
Std. Errors in parentheses
Dependent Variable: nominal overnight interest rate 
 
 
The results presented so far constitute clear evidence of a change in the 
behavior of the central bank of Mexico after the adoption of the inflation target in 
January 1999.  This is reflected by the observed change in the relative importance of 
different variables for monetary policy.  Before 1999, the exchange rate played a key 
role for monetary policy implementation, and conventional variables such as the 
inflation gap were relatively less relevant.  However, once the inflation target was put 
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in place, conventional variables gained importance and the exchange rate lost 
relevance.  However, it is important to keep in mind that, between 1995 and 1999, 
Mexico underwent significant changes and was subject to numerous disturbances. 
Along with the announcement of the adoption of the inflation target, after 1999 
international markets observed greater stability, which might have played a role in the 
observed changes in monetary policy.  This might have helped the central bank to gain 
credibility and, at the same time, to produce an important reduction of the exchange 
rate passthrough, two factors that may explain part of the results in this paper.   
Mexico has nonetheless accumulated more than 50 billion in international 
reserves in the past years and, despite exchange rate volatility has fallen to levels 
comparable with those in other inflation targeting economies such as New Zealand and 
Canada, interest rate volatility remains relatively higher.  This brings forward the need 
to study those countries to put the Mexican case in context in terms of the changes 
around the implementation of the target.   
 
1.4.  Evidence from Canada and New Zealand.   
The purpose of this section is to present some preliminary evidence intended to 
explore whether the adoption of an explicit inflation target in New Zealand and Canada 
has affected the way their central banks respond to changes in the exchange rate and 
other external factors.  The main reason to exploring these two countries is that both are 
small open economies that follow an inflation target under (official) exchange rate 
flexibility.  These countries are characterized by currencies that are sensitive to 
fluctuations of prices of resource-based commodities, and they are highly integrated to 
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financial markets.  Consequently the role of fluctuations in external markets is key for 
monetary policy in these countries.  Also, New Zealand and Canada first implemented 
explicit inflation targets as their monetary policy prescription, and, along with 
Australia, are considered in the literature as the benchmark or reference case for the 
analysis of this policy.   
1.4.1.  The Case of New Zealand From 1985 to 2001. 
1.4.1.1.  Monetary Policy Overview:  Adoption of Inflation Targeting. 
New Zealand underwent significant reforms during the second half of the 
eighties, when inflation reached historical highs and the country suffered from a severe 
recession that was extended until 1989.  In addition to fiscal, trade and other structural 
reforms, important monetary measures were undertaken, including a comprehensive 
financial liberalization and the termination of foreign exchange and interest rate 
controls.   
The abandonment of an exchange rate anchor in 1984 created the need for an 
alternative means to control inflation at the time.  By the end of that year, in an attempt 
to regain inflation control, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand adopted a policy known 
as the “full funding” rule.  The goal was to manage the rate of growth of primary 
liquidity, where government bonds were issued to offset all other liquidity injections to 
the economy.  In 1986, the central bank first engaged in open market operations to 
target the liquidity required for large-scale inter-bank operations (the level of 
settlement cash), and made daily announcements of the rates at which it was willing to 
provide for extra liquidity whenever necessary.  The observed volatility of interest rates 
and the sharp depreciation that the exchange rate suffered in 1988 proved that the 
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relationship between the primary liquidity target and the velocity of money was highly 
unstable.  Even though this meant that the settlement cash target had limited 
macroeconomic significance, it remained as the instrument for monetary policy until 
1999, since the central bank realized that it was not the level but the ability to change 
this target what ultimately could influence financial markets.68   
The adoption of an explicit inflation target in New Zealand was in February of 
1990, after the disinflation program that started in 1985 was almost completed; while 
yearly headline inflation was almost 20 percent in mid 1987, by the end of 1989 it was 
well below 7.5 percent, as shown in Figure 1.5.69  The goal was to bring inflation 
within 3 to 5 percent by the end of 1990, 1.5 to 2.5 percent by the end of 1991 and 0 to 
2 percent by the end of 1992.  For the first year and a half of the operation of the 
inflation target, even though disinflation continued, the real economy did not show any 
signs of recovery since negative rates of growth and increased unemployment were 
observed.  The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the continued recession induced the 
monetary authority to reschedule the timing of the inflation targets one year forward in 
February of 1991, and the exchange rate received close attention from the monetary 
authority, since it consistently depreciated until the first half of 1992, when the 
economy started to recover.   
                                                 
68 See Reserve Bank of New Zealand, “The Evolution of Monetary Policy Implementation”, 
www.rbnz.govt.nz 
69 Headline inflation refers to CPI inflation.  Core or Underlying inflation excludes from inflation 
measures the prices of the most volatile products (or services) included in the CPI.  The implied target 
was provided directly from the Reserve bank of New Zealand and it is a measure consistent with the 
bank’s inflation, output and other variables forecasts and its interest rate projections.   
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Figure 1.5. Underlying Inflation, Headline Inflation 
































































































































































*The inflation targets are point targets as noted above.  The graph plots an implied target series 




             Box 1.2. Monetary Policy in New Zealand 
                                from 1985 to 2001 
 
-Floating since 1984 (after collapse of exchange rate regime). 
-Liquidity management rule up to 1986 (growth of primary 
liquidity). 
-Settlement cash target from 1986 to 1999.  
-Unstable relationship between primary liquidity target and the 
velocity of money. 
-Adoption of scheme: February 1990 (CPI target range). 
-External shocks: Iraq-Kuwait (1991). 
-Use of MCI since 1997, (currently of secondary importance). 
-Instrument: Overnight Cash Rate for inter-bank transactions 
(adopted in 1999).  




Around 1995, some signs of overheating emerged, and there was a danger of 
breaking the established inflation target during the second quarter of 1996.  The 
political arena at the time was such that goals for unemployment and growth were to be 
added to monetary policy.70  By the end of that year, the inflation target had to be re-
adjusted for the second time to a range from 0 to 3 percent instead of 0 to 2 percent.  
Starting formally in 1997 and until recently, the stance of monetary policy was 
                                                 
70 This may suggest that new Zealand went from very strict to less strict inflation targeting.   
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summarized by what the Bank of New Zealand called the Monetary Conditions Index 
(MCI), which measured inflationary pressures from interest rate and exchange rate 
adjustments.  The monetary authority established a band for the MCI to serve as a 
reference to the intended path for monetary policy.  However, the observed MCI was 
consistently off the band due to exchange rate fluctuations and highly volatile interest 
rates.  Arguably, the observed exchange rate fluctuations at the time responded more to 
structural than portfolio adjustments, and thus there was no need for the excessive 
interest rate adjustments.  These facts finally led the monetary authorities to abandon 
the cash target and instead adopt the overnight cash rate (OCR) in March of 1999 as the 
monetary policy instrument.  By managing this rate directly, the central bank has been 
able to provide a range for overnight inter-bank transactions rates and simplify the 
operational aspect of monetary policy, leaving the MCI to a secondary level.   
The OCR remains as the monetary policy instrument and is revised every 6 
weeks on pre-announced dates (as opposed to the previous cash target regime, where 
the adjustments were made at undetermined times), and commercial banks are provided 
with “standing facilities”, allowing them to get extra liquidity from the central bank if 
necessary at a penalty rate and constitute the reference that limits interbank interest 
rates.  There are also daily liquidity management operations for day-to-day liquidity 
adjustments in case of forecast errors.  It is important to note that some authors argue 
that the focus of monetary policy in New Zealand went from looking closely to the 
exchange rate and its effects on inflation to more long-term variables, including the 
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MCI first (which also included the exchange rate but to a lower extent than before) and 
the output gap second.71   
1.4.1.2.  Estimating a Policy Reaction Function for New Zealand From 1988 to 
2001. 
As mentioned before, in this section expression (2) in Section 3 is estimated for 
the case of New Zealand from 1988 to 2001.72  The purpose is to offer some 
preliminary evidence on the possibility of a change in the behavior of the monetary 
authority before and after the adoption of the inflation target in a similar fashion to the 
evidence presented for Mexico.  There are several considerations to take into account.  
First, the frequency of the data is quarterly rather than monthly, which prevents for a 
direct comparison with the experience of Mexico.  Second, the dependent variable 
utilized is the cash rate.  Third, Statistics New Zealand provided the observations for 
the inflation target to generate the credibility gap.73  Fourth, the exchange rate is the 
trade weighted exchange rate index available for that country.  And fifth, New Zealand 
does not have a long-term external bond like that of Mexico, so the 10-year external 
bond is used instead.   
Table 1.14 and Table 1.15 show the results from estimating four alternative 
specifications for expression (2) for New Zealand.  Columns (a) and (c) of Table 1.14 
                                                 
71 See Brash (1998) and Clinton (2001). 
72 Unfortunately, there is no data for inflation expectations before 1988 and constructing a series is 
difficult since bonds indexed to inflation were introduced in November 1995.  Using long versus short 
term bond yields is a possibility but the results (not shown) are very unstable. 
73 I wish to thank Loretta Dobbs, Ronald Mair and Frank Overend in Statistics New Zealand for their 
valuable help in obtaining these and other historical data for New Zealand used in these exercises. 
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show the results for the full sample with and without the lagged dependent variable as a 
regressor respectively using contemporaneous changes in both the trade weighted 
exchange rate and the terms of trade.  Columns (e) and (g) of Table 1.15 show the 
results for the full sample with and without the lagged dependent variable as a regressor 
as well, but use lagged observations for the exchange rate depreciation and the terms of 
trade changes.  Columns (b) and (d) of Table 1.14 and (f) and (h) of Table 1.15 present 
the corresponding results for each of these specifications for the sub-sample starting at 
the end of 1991 that corresponds to the inflation targeting period exclusively (see 
below).   
 
Table 1.14. GMM Estimations  for the Full Sample and  
Selected Sub-samples Using Quarterly Data for New Zealand1/ 
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Full Sample Second Part Full Sample Second Part
constant 1.84* 1.00 2.50* 2.41
(1.00) (1.60) (1.25) (2.31)
lagged nominal overnight cash rate 0.23 0.38** - -
(0.16) (0.15) - -
expected - announced inflation 0.63** 0.79* 0.90*** 1.34**
(0.27) (0.42) (0.22) (0.49)
output gap (hp) 0.62*** 0.53*** 0.72*** 0.76***
(0.16) (0.17) (0.15) (0.17)
trade weighted exchange rate depreciation 0.03 0.01 0.13 0.18
(0.30) (0.24) (0.31) (0.33)
govt. bond yield abroad 0.44** 0.41** 0.56*** 0.54
(0.19) (0.18) (0.17) (0.33)
change in terms of trade 0.21 0.14 0.27** 0.25
(0.14) (0.18) (0.13) (0.21)
R Sq 0.87 0.55 0.83 0.22
Adj R Sq 0.85 0.47 0.82 0.10
Std. Error 1.34 1.30 1.49 1.69
Sum Squared Resid 83.08 52.13 104.45 91.12
J Stat 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
No. of Observations 53 38 53 38
1/ Instrument list includes lags of dependent variable, lags of observed inflation and lags of explanatory variables
*, ** and *** denote 10%, 5% and 1% significance respectively
Std. Errors in parentheses




As opposed to the case of Mexico, the structural change tests for New Zealand 
under these alternative specifications do not identify significant structural changes 
around the adoption of the inflation target.  Instead, the tests identify a change that 
occurred some time between the second quarter of 1996 and the second quarter of 
1997.74  Unfortunately, the limited availability of data does not allow comparison of 
New Zealand’s proposed Taylor rule for before and after that date, and the purpose of 
this paper is to explore any possible changes around the adoption of an explicit 
inflation target.  For these reasons the sub-sample explored starts from the last quarter 
of 1991.75   
It is worth to note several results.  First, for the full sample the credibility gap is 
positive and significant in all four cases (columns (a) and (c) of Table 1.14 and 
columns (e) and (g) of Table 1.15), and excluding the lagged dependent variable pushes 
the value of the estimates upward.  Second, the output gap is also positive and 
significant for the full sample in all four cases, with the omission of the lagged 
dependent variable having the same “upward” effect as for the credibility gap.  Third, 
the long run interest rate abroad shows the same pattern.  Fourth neither the exchange 
rate nor the terms of trade variable are significant regardless of whether they are 
contemporaneous or lagged observations.   
                                                 
74 See Appendix 5. 
75 The selection of this date is not fully arbitrary.  First, it can be argued that during the first few months 
of operation of the target there was still some “noise”.  Second, in January of 1991 there was a negative 
external shock due to the Iraq-Kuwait conflict mentioned previously.  Finally, the economy was still 
suffering from an ongoing recession.  Arguably, partially leaving these factors outside the sub-sample 
makes the comparison against Mexico more plausible.  
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Table 1.15. GMM Estimations  for the Full Sample and  
Selected Sub-samples Using Quarterly Data for New Zealand1/ 
(continued) 
(e) (f) (g) (h)
Full Sample Second Part Full Sample Second Part
constant 1.97* 1.22 2.61** 1.96
(1.14) (1.55) (1.24) (1.59)
lagged nominal overnight cash rate 0.23 0.35** - -
(0.14) (0.15) - -
expected - announced inflation 0.64** 0.83* 0.90*** 1.39***
(0.30) (0.42) (0.22) (0.37)
output gap (hp) 0.62*** 0.53*** 0.73*** 0.73***
(0.17) (0.18) (0.18) (0.19)
lagged trade weighted exchange rate depreciation -0.03 0.00 -0.02 -0.02
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
govt. bond yield abroad 0.43** 0.41** 0.55*** 0.60**
(0.19) (0.19) (0.18) (0.24)
lagged change in terms of trade 0.02 0.05 0.06 0.07
(0.07) (0.10) (0.07) (0.10)
R Sq 0.85 0.53 0.83 0.39
Adj R Sq 0.84 0.44 0.81 0.29
Std. Error 1.40 1.33 1.55 1.49
Sum Squared Resid 91.26 54.88 105.31 71.16
J Stat 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
No. of Observations 53 38 53 38
1/ Instrument list includes lags of dependent variable, lags of observed inflation and lags of explanatory variables
*, ** and *** denote 10%, 5% and 1% significance respectively
Std. Errors in parentheses
Dependent Variable: nominal overnight cash rate 
 
 
Since the lagged dependent variable is significant, it is safe to ignore columns 
(c) and (d) of Table 1.14 and columns (g) and (h) of Table 1.15.  The coefficient for the 
inflation gap is larger and the coefficient for the output gap is smaller for (b) and (f) 
than for (a) and (e).  The interest rate abroad, however, remains stable around 0.4 
across samples.  These results are interesting since, for the case of Mexico with 
monthly data (last three columns of Table 1.5 specifically), both the coefficient for the 
inflation gap and the coefficient for the output gap are smaller for the second part 
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relative to the full sample.76  Also, the exchange rate depreciation rate (contemporary 
or lagged), is not significant at all, regardless of the sample and the specification, 77 
which is the case for the change in the terms of trade variable as well.  The fact that the 
terms of trade and the exchange rate variables are not significant is somewhat 
surprising in the sense that the anecdotal evidence mentioned above suggests that these 
variables were of great importance for monetary policy in New Zealand (particularly 
the exchange rate) during the first few years of operation of the (implicit) inflation 
target.  However, as Bernanke et al (1999) point out, “… it was unclear [prior to 1997] 
whether the exchange rate entered policy decisions as a determinant of future inflation 
or as a goal unto itself”.78  Moreover, the Bank of New Zealand took advantage of an 
existing “terms of trade escape clause” between 1990 and 1991 to accommodate 
external shocks that affected output at the time, which partially supports the results 
presented.  Finally, since it is not straightforward to associate a change in the behavior 
of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand with the adoption of an explicit inflation target in 
that country, a more gradual policy shift relative to Mexico probably occurred.  
Alternatively, the fact that inflation was much lower in New Zealand at the time of the 
adoption may explain these findings.   
 
                                                 
76 A similar pattern can be identified for the case of Mexico with daily data (see Table 1.9 through Table 
1.11). 
77 The only case where the coefficient for exchange rate depreciation presented a similar behavior to that 
in Mexico was when the dependent variable was the real ex-ante short-term interest rate (not reported). 
78 Bernanke et al, p. 98. 
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1.4.2.  The Case of Canada From 1989 to 2001. 
1.4.2.1.  Monetary Policy Overview: From Money Targeting to Inflation 
Targeting.  
Canada was the second country that adopted an explicit inflation target 
following New Zealand, but the cond itions for its implementation were somewhat 
different, since the shift was less “institutionalized” than in New Zealand.79  Towards 
the end of 1982, the Central Bank of Canada decided to drop M1 as its intermediate 
target for monetary policy, and core inflation reached about 12 percent that year.  The 
monetary authority failed to establish an alternative monetary target that could work as 
a nominal anchor, but nonetheless inflation fell and averaged 5 percent between 1985 
and 1990.  In 1988, Bank of Canada decided to explicitly promote price-stability as its 
long-term goal, but it was not until February of 1991 when it decided to formalize the 
shift towards the pursue of an explicit inflation target.  The overnight interest rate for 
large valued inter-bank transactions became the monetary policy tool; by establishing 
an operating range for this interest rate, the monetary authority managed to conduct 
monetary policy in order to meet the policy goal.   
Some documents from the Central Bank of Canada itself point out that it is not 
fully clear why Canada adopted an inflation target in February of 1991.  The country 
entered a deep recession in 1990, allowing inflation to keep its downward trend 
(reaching 4.2 percent that year), and there were no major events in the foreign 
                                                 
79 New Zealand’s inflation targeting is more “formal” than Canada’s in the sense that in the former the 
institutional framework is relatively more strict in terms of its implementation (see Bernanke et al 
[1999]).   
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exchange market.  Large risk premiums that developed at the time due to increasing 
public and external debt, and a somewhat unstable political environment along with 
lack of credibility may have been the spark for the policy shift.  The central bank 
argued that the idea was to make clear to the public the rate of progress made in 
reducing inflation in order to increase people’s confidence in monetary policy. 80   
Along the same lines as New Zealand, rather than adopting point-targets for 
inflation, the Central Bank of Canada established a target range of 2 percent around a 
midpoint set at 3 percent at the end of 1992, 2.5 percent in June of 1994 and 2 percent 
in December of 1995.  Despite some inflationary pressures that emerged in 1991 as a 
consequence of the oil price shock associated with the conflict in Kuwait and an 
increase in domestic taxes, the inflation target was undershot in 1991 and 1992, as 
shown in Figure 1.6.  These events were considered as one-time price changes and 
therefore there was no need for interest rate changes.  Nonetheless, as of 1993, 
concerns about increasing unemployment developed and the exchange rate consistently 
depreciated.  Towards the second half of 1995, a heated debate about the lack of 
recovery of the economy emerged, with some blaming slow growth on excessively 
aggressive inflation reductions.  However, the bank argued that external factors such as 
the Tequila crisis and increases in international interest rates, along with additional 
domestic structural changes were key to the observed slow recovery.   
                                                 
80 As a signal of commitment, real return government bonds were introduced 3 months after the first 
target was announced.   
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Figure 1.6. Headline Inflation, Core Inflation  






































































































































































































    * The Inflation Target shown is at the end of the year, not at the time of the announcement so that  
       deviations mean failure to meet the target corresponding to the end of the year. 
 
Currently, monetary policy in Canada continues to rely on the overnight money 
market rate as the policy instrument.  The central bank establishes a range of 50 basis 
points for the overnight target rate on large value transfers among financial institutions.  
The ceiling for this band is the rate at which the central bank lends additional cash if 
necessary to financial institutions to cover short-term deficits (overdrafts), while the 
floor is the rate that the central bank pays for excess cash held by financial institutions.  
By modifying the target rate, the bank affects other interest rates such as the bank rate 
and the money rate, and therefore the amount of cash in the system.  The central bank 
also relies on a monetary conditions index similar to that of New Zealand to assess the 
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stance of monetary policy.  This index has been considered a short run operational 
target for monetary policy implementation, but not an anchor in itself or a commitment 
to alter the exchange rate.81   
 
       Box 1.3. Monetary Policy in Canada 
       from 1989 to 2001 
 
-Recession in 1990 (no previous exchange rate collapse). 
-Monetary policy target M1 (up to 1982). 
-Price stability as long-term goal since 1988. 
-Large risk premiums in 1990. 
-Adoption of scheme: February 1991 (CPI target range). 
-External Shocks: Mexico (1994). 
-Instrument: Overnight Money Market Rate (large scale inter-
bank transactions). 
-Reduced headline inflation from around 7% in 1990 to around 
1% in 2001; core inflation from around 4.5% to somewhat 
below 2%.  
 
 
1.4.2.2.  Estimating a Policy Reaction Function for Canada: From 1989 to 2001. 
Following the discussion about monetary policy rules in Section 2, expression 
(2) is estimated for Canada using monthly data.  In the present case, the credibility gap 
(or inflation gap) has been calculated by subtracting the midpoint of the inflation target 
range (see Figure 1.6) from the observations for inflation expectations available in 
                                                 
81 See Bernanke et al (1999) and references therein.   
77 
Consensus Forecasts from surveys to the private sector.82  The monthly output gap was 
interpolated directly from the quarterly series constructed by the Bank of Canada.83  I 
use the exchange rate in domestic currency per US dollars, the inflation of the price of 
commodities and the 10-year external bond return as the remaining explanatory 
variables.  The dependent variable is either the overnight money rate or the bank rate, 
instead of the target rate, due to limited data availability for the latter; as Figure 1.7 
shows, both are closely linked to the target rate.   
                                                 
82 See Consensus Economics (various volumes). 
















































































































































































































*Source: Bank of Canada.  The target rate is the Bank of Canada’s official rate or policy rate (for 
overnight transactions); the bank rate used to be the policy rate (now it constitutes an upper bound 
to the official rate, and it is the minimum rate at which the Bank of Canada extends short-term 
advances to financial institutions); the money market rate is the rate at which major participants in 
the money market borrow and lend one-day funds to each other.  See 
http://www.bankofcanada.ca/en/glossary/glossary.htm  
 
In terms of the validity of equation (2) for the case of Canada, there are several 
interesting facts to consider.  First, according to Armour et al (2002), the overall 
research goal at the Bank of Canada has been to find a Taylor-type rule that is robust 
across different models.  The bulk of the research considers different monetary policy 
rules and embeds them in different macroeconomic models.  In that context, a given 
rule is said to be robust to the extent that it can replicate or track the observed behavior 
of inflation and output.  One of the most widely cited models is known as the Quarterly 
Projection Model (QPM), which uses a forecast-based rule.  Yetman (2001) argues that 
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credibility can be measured simply as a function of the distance between the 
expectations of agents (or the perceived target) and the actual target.  These facts allow 
to think that the credibility gap (expected - announced inflation) is a plausible regressor 
in expression (2) proposed here.  This is because a rule that considers the credibility 
gap is able to replicate the behavior of variables relevant from the point of view of the 
monetary authority in Canada.  Second, as Bernanke et al (1999) stress, Canada is a 
small open economy largely dependent on exports of natural resources (or natural 
resource based products for that matter), and since the MCI has been used as an 
indicator of the stance of monetary policy, it seems plausible to include both the 
inflation rate for commodity prices and the exchange rate depreciation rate as 
explanatory variables for monetary policy.  Third, external indebtedness (public and 
private) has been crucial in terms of the conduction of monetary policy, so that the 
interest rate on (long run) external bonds could also be relevant for the analysis.   
The results for the full sample using GMM are presented in Table 1.16.  For 
columns (a) and (b) the dependent variable is the bank rate, while for columns (c) and 
(d) it is the money rate.  The coefficients are all of the expected signs, but the exchange 
rate and the commodity prices are not significant in any of the four cases.  With respect 
to the magnitudes of the estimations, Côté et al (2002), Clinton (2001), Armour et al 
(2002) and Yetman (2001) among others find that the coefficients for Taylor-type rules 
that are robust (as defined above) should oscillate between 1.5 and 2.5 for the inflation 
gap and around 0.5 for the output gap.  The estimates presented here are surprisingly 
close to these figures: the coefficient for the inflation gap ranges between 1.6 and 2.0, 
while the coefficient for the output gap ranges from 0.39 to 0.52. 
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Table 1.16. GMM Estimations  for the Full Sample 
Using Monthly Data for Canada1/ 
(a) (b) (c) (d)
constant -1.90 -1.54 -1.60 -1.30
(1.44) (1.32) (1.54) (1.43)
expected - announced inflation 1.65** 1.71** 1.82** 2.00**
(0.74) (0.67) (0.80) (0.77)
output gap (Bank of Canada) 0.52*** 0.46*** 0.43** 0.39**
(0.19) (0.17) (0.22) (0.19)
exchange rate depreciation 1.12 - 0.65 -
(1.30) - (1.31) -
lagged exchange rate depreciation - 0.95 - 0.74
- (1.07) - (1.03)
10 year external bond 1.14*** 1.08*** 1.06*** 1.00**
(0.20) (0.20) (0.23) (0.22)
change in commodity prices 0.08 - 0.05 -
(0.11) - (0.11) -
lagged change in commodity prices - 0.05 - 0.02
- (0.10) - (0.10)
R Sq 0.62 0.69 0.71 0.70
Adj R Sq 0.61 0.68 0.70 0.68
Std. Error 1.68 1.51 1.50 1.51
Sum Squared Resid 396.03 316.88 315.62 316.66
J Stat 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
No. of Observations 146 145 146 145
*, ** and *** denote 10%, 5% and 1% significance respectively
Std. Errors in parentheses
1/ Instrument list includes lags of dependent variable, lags of observed inflation
    and lags of explanatory variables





With respect to the insignificance of the coefficient on the exchange rate 
depreciation, Longworth (2000) argues that “[the Central Bank of Canada has not] 
relied on the exchange rate passthrough to consumer prices to guide inflation to its 
target” (p. 39).  Although he recognizes that reacting to exchange rate changes could be 
helpful for reducing inflation, this would be at the expense of higher output variability.  
Secondly, as Côté et al (2002) find, “rules that react exclusively to [the inflation gap 
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and to the output gap] often outperform rules that also include the exchange rate” (p. 
31).  This is because, they argue, the exchange rate is a shock absorber that helps to 
stabilize the economy, and any attempt to smooth exchange rate fluctuations introduces 
more volatility to the (Canadian) economy.84  This may explain the result here that the 
exchange rate is not significant.  Amano and Wirjanto (1994) on the contrary, find 
(weak) evidence that the Bank of Canada was pursuing an exchange rate target between 
1971 and 1992.85  This may suggest that the fear of floating phenomenon is purely 
transitional, as suggested for the case of Mexico above.86   
The endogenous structural change tests (see Appendix 6) identify four breaks 
according to the Sequential Procedure criterion.  The first break occurred around March 
1993 (in late 1993, Canada underwent internal political conflict over whether the 
central bank was “too aggressive” in pursuing its inflation target); the second break 
occurred by December 1994 (when the Central Bank announced explicitly that it would 
keep the target rate within a 50 basis points band); the third around September 1996; 
and the fourth by August 1999.  The fact that no break associated with the adoption of 
the inflation target was found can be explained, along the lines discussed by Bernanke 
                                                 
84 See also Bernanke et al (1999) 
85 Unfortunately we cannot consider such a sample due to limited data availability.  If this were true, the 
coefficient for the exchange rate depreciation rate could be significant for specific sub-samples. 
86 By no means should one take the results presented here as conclusive evidence about the behavior of 
the Central Bank of Canada.  In fact, the estimations are not fully robust to changes (forward) in the 
sample.  Even though the point estimates remain relatively constant over time, the explanatory power of 
the regression declines quickly (negative R-squared stats are easily obtained, which suggests that the 
instruments are perhaps not the most adequate).   
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et al (1999), by arguing that the Central Bank of Canada was already following an 
implicit target before February of 1991.  From Table 1.14 it seems that the relatively 
better fit is that in column (c).  With this in mind, Table 1.17 reproduces this estimation 
(labeled as (e)) along with the sample that goes from the second to the fourth break 
(labeled as (f) in Table 1.17), that is, from April 1993 to October 1999 (see also Figure 
1.7).  Notice that the coefficient for the inflation gap remains basically unchanged, 
while the coefficient for the output gap increases by almost one half.  The coefficient 
for the exchange rate depreciation remains insignificant.  Overall, these results are in 
line with those from research conducted at the Bank of Canada (see above).  While 
both the inflation gap and the output gap are key for monetary policy decisions, 
changes in the exchange rate are not considered to be of direct importance.  However, 
two issues that seem contradictory remain to be explored.  The point estimates are 
surprisingly close to those that replicate Canadian output and inflation behavior in 
simulated macroeconomic models (2.0 for the inflation gap and 0.5 for the output gap).  
But at the same time, these coefficients appear to be highly unstable over time, very 
sensitive to specific episodes and to specific observations.87   
                                                 
87 The second regression in Table 1.17 is not quite robust.  The estimations for the different sub-samples 
identified are somewhat mixed.  The coefficients appear to be unstable in the sub-samples that lie 
between the second and third breaks found.  Also, rolling regressions (not reported) show that the 
coefficients are highly unstable. 
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Table 1.17. GMM Estimations  for the Full Sample and  
Selected Sub-samples Using Monthly Data for Canada1/ 
(e) 2/ (f) 3/
constant -1.60 3.99***
(1.54) (1.18)
expected - announced inflation 1.82** 1.79**
(0.80) (0.78)
output gap (Bank of Canada) 0.43** 0.64***
(0.22) (0.22)
exchange rate depreciation 0.65 0.64
(1.31) (0.66)
10 year external bond 1.06*** 0.26*
(0.23) (0.15)
change in commodity prices 0.05 0.04
(0.11) (0.07)
R Sq 0.71 0.23
Adj R Sq 0.70 0.18
Std. Error 1.50 1.10
Sum Squared Resid 315.62 88.80
J Stat 0.0000 0.0206 4/
No. of Observations 146 79
*, ** and *** denote 10%, 5% and 1% significance respectively
Std. Errors in parentheses
1/ Instrument list includes lags of dependent variable, lags of observed 
    inflation and lags of explanatory variables
2/ Full Sample
3/ April 1993 to October 1999
4/ P-value = 0.20, so that the overidentifying restriction is valid
Dependent Variable: Money Rate
 
 
As for the case of New Zealand, there is no clear evidence of a change in the 
behavior of the central bank upon the explicit adoption of the inflation target in 
Canada, which can be explained by the argument above that the policy shift was more 
gradual and in fact it is difficult to fully determine what led the monetary authority to 
such change.  In contrast, what is striking is that in none of these three countries the 
does exchange rate depreciation directly affect the monetary policy instrument under 
inflation targeting.  This is not sufficient evidence to conclude that the exchange rate 
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does not matter for monetary policy, but it is sufficient to conclude that these countries 
to a large extent meet the exchange rate flexibility requirement for inflation targeting to 
be successful, and focus their attention on more conventional variables such as 
expectations for future inflation and the output gap, as prescribed by the theory.   
1.4.3.  Summing Up: The Three Cases Contrasted. 
Mexico, New Zealand and Canada, adopted this monetary policy scheme in less 
than optimal economic circumstances: both Mexico and New Zealand were coming out 
of collapsed exchange rate regimes while Canada was still under the effects of a 
recession that started a few years before, and the three countries faced large risk 
premiums and were subject to external shocks.  Also, a key factor is that New Zealand 
and Canada adopted inflation targets at much lower inflation rates than Mexico, since 
this might have implied different priorities for each country’s monetary authority.  In 
all of them, however, it was possible to bring inflation within the proposed targets, but 
a “too stringent” monetary policy has been frequently blamed of preventing economic 
growth, which was particularly relevant in the political arena around 1995 in Canada.   
Before the adoption of the inflation target, all three countries pursued a liquidity 
control policy toward affecting large-scale inter-bank operations: “settlement cash” in 
New Zealand, M1 in Canada and domestic credit in Mexico.  Currently, Canada and 
New Zealand use overnight interest rates for this type of inter-bank operations as policy 
instruments, allowing them to fluctuate within specified limits that are modified 
regularly.  Mexico on the contrary, still relies on affecting quantities rather than interest 
rates through the use of borrowed reserves (el corto).  Canada and New Zealand, in 
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turn, continue to take into account a Monetary Conditions Index as an indicator of the 
stance of monetary policy, although it has been relegated to a secondary role.   
With respect to the transition toward inflation targeting, the policy shift was 
more gradual in Canada, while Mexico and New Zealand adopted inflation targeting in 
a more “institutionalized” fashion, with more clear goals and guidelines for its 
operation, at least in the initial stages.  In this respect, the structural test results show 
that only for Mexico is there a clear structural change around the adoption of the 
explicit target in 1999.  Neither Canada nor New Zealand display any structural 
changes associated with the adoption of this policy.  While this result may be consistent 
with the smooth transition described for Canada, for New Zealand the explanation 
relies perhaps on the initial pursuit of an implicit target, but since this was also the case 
for Mexico, one might need to look for alternative arguments.   
Table 1.18 summarizes the policy rule estimation results for Mexico (with both 
monthly and daily data), New Zealand and Canada respectively.  Rather than repeating 
the output from previous sections, this table shows only whether the variables are 
econometrically significant for two sets of samples: the full sample in the first column, 
and the inflation target sub-sample in the second; for the case of Mexico with daily data 
the sub-samples correspond to before and after the adoption of the target.  The third and 
sixth columns show in what direction the coefficient changes under inflation targeting 
relative to the full sample.  One of the most interesting results is that the output gap is 
always significant in all three countries.  Also, the inflation gap is significant whenever 
the inflation target is in operation in all three cases.   
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Table 1.18. Summary of Key Results 
Full Sample Target No Target Target
05/96-12/01 10/98-12/01 05/96-08/98 05/99-12/01
Constant S S higher NS S lower
Lagged Dep. Var. NS S higher NS S higher
Expected - Announced Inflation NS S lower S S higher
Output Gap S S lower S S lower
ER Depreciation Rate S NS lower S NS lower
Govt. Bond Yield Abroad S S lower S S lower
Terms of Trade Changes NS NS higher S NS higher
1/ From Table 5 2/ From Table 9
Full Sample Target No Target Target
1988-2001 1991-2001 1989-1990 1993-2001
Constant S NS lower NS S higher
Lagged Dep. Var. NS S higher NA NA NA
Expected - Announced Inflation S S higher S S higher
Output Gap S S lower S S higher
ER Depreciation Rate NS NS no change NS NS lower
Govt. Bond Yield Abroad S S lower S S lower
Terms of Trade Changes NS NS no change NS NS lower
3/ From Table 12 4/ From Table 17
S = Significant
NS = Not significant
Variable








Another interesting result is that in all three cases the exchange rate 
depreciation does not have explanatory power under inflation targeting.  Using daily 
data for the case of Mexico allows me to split the sample before the target (excluding 
the Asian and Russian crises) and under the target.  The exchange rate variable is 
empirically relevant for monetary policy in Mexico only before the inflation target was 
adopted, but not once the target was in operation.  This result, and the fact that both the 
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output gap and the inflation gap are empirically relevant for monetary policy under 
inflation targeting lead me to conclude that the monetary authority in Mexico is 
converging qualitatively toward responding to conventional variables, as is the case for 
New Zealand and Canada.  Moreover, these results show that the exchange rate is more 
of a shock absorber than an intended target for the monetary authority, and perhaps 
more importantly, that fear of floating was a transitional phenomenon in Mexico.   
The return on the government bond yield abroad is significant in all cases for 
the three countries, leading to believe that the perception among investors abroad is 
relevant for monetary policy decisions.  This result is important because it is consistent 
with the idea that these countries are highly integrated to international markets and to 
different degrees rely on external capital flows.  Interestingly, the value of the 
coefficient associated with this variable is reduced under inflation targeting in the three 
countries considered.   
Finally, it is worth mentioning that in all three countries there is evidence that 
the monetary authority engages in some degree of interest rate smoothing.  As 
mentioned earlier in the paper, this may be explained along the lines of avoiding large 
shifts in the position of borrowers and overstressing a continuously developing 
financial sector. 
 
1.5.  Conclusions . 
Arguably, the identification of different phenomena that affect monetary policy 
is perhaps best addressed by looking at the reaction function of the central bank as in 
Taylor (1998) and others.  Since most empirical studies on the topic tend to focus on 
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large open economies or closed economies, they fail to address the impact of other 
channels of monetary transmission that are considered relevant for small open 
economies.  The main purpose of this paper was precisely to explore the extent to 
which the adoption of an explicit inflation target in Mexico could be associated with a 
de facto change in the monetary authority’s behavior, in terms of its response to 
different variables that are considered relevant for monetary policy, including the 
exchange rate and other variables suggested by Svensson (1998) and others. 
Using endogenous structural change tests, a change in the behavior of the 
monetary authority in Mexico can in fact be associated with the adoption of an explicit 
inflation target in 1999.  Before that, the exchange rate played a key role for monetary 
policy implementation, and conventional variables such as the inflation gap were 
relatively less relevant.  However, once the inflation target was put in place, these 
variables gained importance for monetary policy and the exchange rate lost relevance.  
In this respect, an important issue that must be acknowledged is that the conditions 
under which these countries adopted inflation targeting were not quite the same: the 
inflation rate in Mexico, for example, was much higher at the time of adoption than in 
New Zealand and Canada.  Also, international markets were relatively more stable after 
1999, and this probably affected monetary policy decisions, since it was perhaps less 
costly for the Central Bank of Mexico to gain credibility.  An additional element is that 
an important reduction of the exchange rate passthrough was accomplished.  Finally, 
Mexico accumulated more than 50 billion in international reserves in the past years 
and, despite exchange rate volatility has fallen to levels comparable with those in New 
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Zealand and Canada, interest rate volatility remains relatively higher, which is an open 
issue still to be explored.   
In general, the estimations for Mexico under inflation targeting are qualitatively 
more similar to those of New Zealand and Canada: exchange rate and terms of trade 
changes lose relevance, while conventional variables, along with country risk 
measures, remain key to monetary policy behavior.  Through the use of high frequency 
data for Mexico, I confirm a change in the central bank’s behavior after 1999, where 
the exchange rate no longer explained the instrument variable.  These results may be 
safely interpreted as evidence of some sort of “convergence”, in terms of the variables 
taken into account for monetary policy in Mexico, toward those in New Zealand and 
Canada.   
The fact that the exchange rate no longer explained the instrument variable 
suggests that, before the adoption of the target in 1999, Mexico was perhaps using a 
monetary conditions index to evaluate monetary policy decisions.  Alternatively it may 
suggest a temporary or transitional nature for what has been identified as fear of 
floating.  This transitional nature of fear of floating can be rationalized either by the 
idea of the central bank trying to build reputation during “hard times”, or by the idea 
that in extreme circumstances policymaking should be comprehensive for the sake of 
consistency.  This might be classified as what is known as constrained inflation 
targeting, whereby high levels of passthrough, and in some instances lack of credibility, 
may induce central bankers to react to variables that would otherwise be irrelevant.  
Therefore fear of floating phenomenon need not be perverse, but instead, could be a 
response to a set of conditions under which the monetary authority reacts.  There is an 
90 
underlying optimization process that leads a country’s central bank to respond in 
different manners to different shocks, and considering this optimization process is the 
best possible way to analyze monetary policy as a whole.  In fact, monetary policy 
reports in all three countries express their concern about the importance of exchange 
rate behavior for the accomplishment of other policy targets.   
Finally, one may think of many issues that generate the possibility of changes in 
the behavior of the central bank.  These may be due to changes in the external 
environment (from high volatility to relative stability) or to changes in the 
characteristics of the central bank itself.  In any case, given the results obtained for 
Mexico as compared to those for New Zealand and Canada, the central bank’s observed 
actions may be a signal of commitment in difficult times, and a clear indication that in 
some instances the exchange rate constitutes an additional constraint for policymaking 
in a small open inflation-targeting economy.   
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“…countries that appear to behave according to the 
declared regime during tranquil times may be tempted 
to change their course of action once the regime is 
under stress. Thus, a very different picture of 
exchange rate regime choices may appear once the 
international context becomes more volatile.”88   
 
Chapter 2.  Reputation and Endogenous Persistence. 
 
2.1.  Introduction. 
After the crisis of 1995, Mexico not only entered a deep recession, but also 
observed a rebound in domestic inflation fueled by severe external shocks accompanied 
by high exchange rate volatility.  Nonetheless, since the adoption of an explicit 
inflation target in January of 1999, not only has inflation diminished consistently, but 
also the gap between inflation expectations and inflation announcements has been 
reduced, suggesting that there have been credibility gains.  Moreover, the exchange rate 
pass-through to prices has fallen, 89 and the extent to which the monetary policy 
instrument reacts to exchange rate changes has diminished significantly.90   
A more stable external environment, the adoption of an explicit inflation target 
and the credibility gains, along with a lower pass-through and (arguably) a more 
cautious external indebtedness may explain the success of monetary policy in that 
country.  However, a recent concern about real-side performance has emerged.  Indeed, 
projected GDP growth has been revised downward since 2000.  At the same time, it has 
                                                 
88 Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2002), p. 2. 
89 See Garcés (1999).  For an international analysis of exchange rate pass-through see Baqueiro et al 
(2002) and references therein. 
90 See Torres (2001) and Chapter 1 here. 
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been argued that monetary policy is too stringent and has curtailed economic 
performance.   
It may seem irrational for the central bank to continue to pursue a tight 
monetary policy if that restrains economic growth.  In this paper, a reputation model 
based on Drazen and Masson (1994) (DM) is presented whereby the monetary 
authority may induce negative spillovers that translate into lower output by not 
following a stringent monetary policy.  Put more simply, a two-period model of 
reputation shows that, whenever the monetary authority deviates from zero inflation in 
face of an exogenous output shock, while it may offset the contemporaneous negative 
effect of such shock on unemployment, it may impose restrictions on 
producers/investors such that future unemployment increases.  This effect reinforces 
the reputational effect standard in Backus and Driffill (1985) in the sense that no-
inflation observations increase reputation, and a higher future output cost from inflating 
in the present may induce a policymaker not to inflate in the present, making reputation 
investment more attractive. 
The paper is organized as follows.  In the next section, a brief exposition of the 
literature about the role of exchange rates, the importance of explicit over implicit 
inflation targeting, and the role of exchange rate pass-through and balance sheet effects 
in inflation targeting countries is presented.  In Section 3 a modification to DM’s model 
that allows for endogenous persistence in order to rationalize the role of external 
factors, credibility concerns and balance-sheet effects in pursuing tight monetary policy 
is presented.  Section 4 concludes. 
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2.2.  Inflation Targeting: Some Important Issues. 
2.2.1.  Information and Control under Inflation Targeting. 
One of the most discussed issues in inflation targeting countries is that of 
transparency, credibility and accountability of monetary policy.  It is argued that an 
increase in transparency has allowed economic agents to build up an improved 
perception of monetary policy that has translated into improved inflation expectations 
for the public and improved inflation control for the policymaker.  Faust and Svensson 
(2000), for example, explore the extent to which policy transparency (measured as the 
degree to which economic agents can infer the central bank’s intentions) is welfare 
improving whenever output preferences of the central bank are not fully observable.  
They show that, in general, higher transparency leads to lower output and inflation 
variability and hence to higher welfare.  This is because increased transparency leads a 
central bank that is concerned about its reputation to a stronger commitment toward the 
social optimum.  Geraats (2001) shows that transparency (measured as the publication 
of central bank’s forecasts) can be beneficial for a central bank to enhance its 
reputation.  Information disclosure allows the public to infer the central bank’s 
objectives and hence avoid biases in their inflation expectations, which in turn allows 
the central bank to increase its reputation.  Yetman (2001) explores the role of learning 
under implicit inflation targeting and imperfect control.  He shows that it is not 
sufficient to move toward an explicit inflation target framework, but it is also crucial to 
increase transparency in order to gain credibility and thus increase welfare.  Finally, 
Nolan and Schalling (1996) explore the role of increased accountability and its 
94 
relationship with central bank independence in reducing inflationary expectations.  All 
these models assume imperfect control over inflation and imperfect knowledge of the 
central bank’s intentions (i.e., the central bank’s type) with respect to inflation and/or 
output.  The key argument is that information disclosure and, arguably, explicit 
inflation targeting is welfare improving. 
2.2.2.  Inflation Targeting in Small Open Economies. 
It may be argued that foreign interest rates, country risk, and the exchange rate 
itself, along with the occurrence of crises in other emerging markets and the extent to 
which they affect capital flows, play a crucial role in the decision process of 
policymaking in small open economies.  The role of external factors has been 
considered crucial for economic policy, particularly in emerging markets.91  This 
suggests an important distinction in terms of monetary policy between open and closed 
economies.  Recently, a vast literature, both theoretical and empirical, has focused on 
the distinction between small open economies that pursue an inflation target as the 
primary objective, and closed economies.  Ball (1999, 2000) for example, explores the 
implications for exchange rate management from adopting an explicit inflation target in 
small open economies, and attempts to outline how monetary policy should differ 
between open and closed economies.  Ball argues that small open economies that 
attempt to stabilize inflation and output should also take into account exchange rate 
fluctuations, and that “[Taylor] rules must be modified to give a role to the exchange 
rate”. 92  Others like Svensson (1998), Agénor (2000) and Clarida et al (2001) argue that 
                                                 
91 See for example Calvo, Leiderman and Reinhart (1993) for Latin America. 
92 Ball (2000), p. 2. 
95 
the exchange rate plays a central role for monetary policy transmission and affects 
inflation and output and, as Agénor points out, “[B]ecause foreign shocks are 
transmitted through the exchange rate, and the exchange rate affects consumer price 
inflation, stabilizing exchange rates has remained an important consideration under 
inflation targeting”. 93   
2.2.3.  Inflation Targeting and Exchange Rate Fluctuations. 
In the past decade, many countries abandoned intermediate exchange rate 
regimes and officially adopted either hard pegs or free floating, some of them in 
combination with inflation targeting.94,95  However, this apparent trend has been 
challenged by the observation that intermediate exchange rate regimes have not quite 
disappeared.  For example, Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2002) construct de facto 
classifications for exchange rate regimes and find that neither fixed nor free floating 
official regimes prevail, but instead, the former observe some degree of flexibility 
while the latter observe relatively limited exchange rate fluctuations.96   
To explain this “false” divergence from intermediate exchange rate regimes, on 
the fix side, Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger identify a fear of pegging, where 
policymakers announce less-than-fixed regimes in an attempt to minimize speculation 
                                                 
93 Agénor (2000), p. 16. 
94 IMF World Economic Outlook , October 1997.  See also Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements 
and Exchange Restrictions, IMF, various volumes. 
95 This phenomenon can be explained in several manners.  For example, the integration of financial 
markets and the higher degree of capital mobility can negatively affect the performance of managed 
floating regimes.  See for example Eichengreen (1994) and Fischer (2001).   
96 See also Reinhart and Rogoff (2003), forthcoming. 
96 
and the likeliness of collapse, but de facto follow a fixed regime.  On the float side, 
different hypotheses have emerged to explain what Calvo and Reinhart (2002) labeled 
as fear of floating.  In an attempt to identify the extent to which managed floating has 
“disappeared” as an exchange rate policy alternative in practice, they find evidence that 
many countries that claim to follow a free-floating exchange rate regime are not quite 
doing so and instead observe relatively stable exchange rate behavior.  They illustrate 
that inflation targeting, in combination with lack of credibility and high exchange rate 
passthrough to prices, may explain this observation.  If lack of credibility is associated 
with highly volatile risk-premiums, the monetary authority may find it optimal to 
engage in (some degree of) exchange rate smoothing to offset the effects of exchange 
rate fluctuations on price inflation, and this incentive will be stronger the higher the 
commitment to low inflation variations.  Others like Hausmann et al (2000) find that 
free-floating countries in fact allow for different degrees of exchange rate flexibility, 
and argue that this phenomenon may be explained by different degrees of exchange 
rate pass-through to prices and/or the inability for these countries to borrow in domestic 
currency.  Given a high passthrough and that firms’ liabilities are denominated in 
foreign currency, the monetary authority, concerned that depreciations are inflationary 
and contractionary, acts to avoid excessive exchange rate volatility.  Conversely, 
Lahiri and Végh (2001) attempt to rationalize the fear of floating phenomenon through 
the existence of an output cost of both nominal exchange rate fluctuations and higher 
interest rates (to limit such fluctuations), along with a fixed cost of interventions.   
This reclassification of exchange rate regimes in general, and the identification 
of fear of floating in particular, brings attention to countries where inflation constitutes 
97 
the primary goal of monetary policy.  Indeed, Calvo and Reinhart’s (2002) hypothesis 
becomes highly relevant in these countries, since exchange rate flexibility is considered 
as a necessary condition for inflation targeting to be successful, 97 and their argument 
gains strength exactly in small open economies where lack of credibility, high levels of 
exchange rate pass-through and financial market imperfections are more frequent than 
not.   
 
2.3.  Inflation Targeting in Mexico: Some Stylized Facts. 
The collapse of the exchange rate band in 1995 translated into high inflation 
and a considerable output cost.  To offset the inflationary effects of the devaluation and 
regain stability, an explicit domestic credit target was established along with the 
imposition of a zero-average legal reserve requirement for commercial banks.  Also, 
the Federal Government and the central bank agreed upon pursuing goals for yearly 
inflation, without considering them as official targets.98  It was not until January 1999 
that an explicit inflation target was announced for the first time.  The shift in policy 
determination was mostly due to the observed weakening of the relationship between 
the demand for money and the intermediate target used prior to 1999, but also to the 
difficulties derived from the external environment during the previous two years and 
the authority’s concern about reputational matters.  The Asian and Russian crises of 
1997 and 1998 affected Mexico’s exchange rate behavior to the extent that the 
                                                 
97 See Taylor (1998). 
98 For a detailed description of the operation of monetary policy since 1995 see Carstens and Werner 
(1999) and references therein.   
98 
monetary authority was forced to revise its (implicit) inflation goals upward and 
intervene directly in the foreign exchange market.  However, despite the Brazilian 
crisis in early 1999 and the highly volatile prices of oil, higher transparency in 
monetary policy allowed for inflation expectations to fall considerably, and observed 
inflation to reach about 4 percent in 2001 from almost 20 percent in 1998, meaning that 
observed inflation met the announcements consistently (see Figure 2.1) since 1999.  In 
addition to the observed fall in the gap between inflation expectations and inflation 
announcements (as shown in Figure 2.2), and the success in maintaining inflation 
below target from 1999 onward, the exchange rate pass-through to prices decreased 
significantly, both in speed and magnitude,99 and the fear of floating phenomenon 
diminished significantly and perhaps entirely disappeared.100   
These facts are of particular relevance to the idea that a central bank willing to 
invest in reputation may be prevented from doing so under extremely adverse 
circumstances.  Specifically, the occurrence of crises abroad might have generated 
conditions that forced the central bank of Mexico to intervene directly in foreign 
exchange markets and review its inflation targets upward.  This behavior can be 
                                                 
99 See Garcés (1999).  For an international comparison about the behavior of exchange rate pass-through, 
see Baqueiro et al (2002) and references therein. 
100 See Torres (2001).  A key result in Chapter 1 is that the monetary authority in Mexico appeared to be 
moving away from responding to changes in the exchange rate, interrupted by extraordinary conditions 
in the international markets around 1998. 
99 
explained along the lines of escape clauses, where the central bank may abandon its 
monetary policy rule under extreme circumstances defined in advance.101   
 


































































































































































































*Source: Banco de Mexico 
 
The fear of floating phenomenon may be explained as a result of lack of 
credibility and a strong commitment to inflation targeting (to rebuild reputation) as in 
Calvo and Reinhart (op cit), or as a result of exchange rate passthrough to prices and 
balance sheet effects as in Hausmann et al (op cit), but the observed temporary nature 
of this phenomenon would require endogenizing risk, exchange rate pass-through 
and/or the balance sheets effect: successfully meeting inflation targets not only would 
                                                 
101 See for example Flood and Isard (1989), Persson and Tabellini (1990) and Drazen and Masson 
(1993). 
100 
enhance reputation and lower subsequent inflation expectations, but it would also lower 
perceived risks, affect price setting procedures and diminish financial market frictions 
such that the pervasive effect of exchange rate fluctuations would fade away.  This may 
therefore provide a good explanation for the observations in Mexico mentioned above, 
namely the fall in the gap between expected and announced inflation (interpreted as 
credibility gains), and the fall in the speed and magnitude of the exchange rate pass-
through.  However, the fact that country risk has not continued to fall (see Figure 2.3) 
may suggest that there is another factor involved in monetary policy decisions that is 
closely linked to reputation. 
 





























































































































































*Source: Banco de Mexico 
 
101 
These different arguments may well explain why the central bank decided to 
move toward an explicit inflation target, why it put such targets under revision and why 
under some extreme circumstances it decided to intervene directly in the foreign 
exchange market as well.  Lahiri and Végh (op cit) may further explain this last matter. 
However, this literature fails to explain first the temporary nature of the fear of floating 
experienced in Mexico, and second the continuation of a somewhat stringent monetary 
policy at an apparently important output cost or, more simply, a somewhat sluggish 
economic recovery in the past two years, as shown in Figure 2.4.   
 
















































































  *Source: JP Morgan and Bloomberg. 
  EMBI is a measure of country risk based on the returns of different bonds held abroad. 
  UMS26 is the return on long term government bonds held abroad (in dollars). 
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In the next section, a modification to Drazen and Masson (1994) model is 
presented to attempt to explain why a central bank that faces an additional cost to that 
of losing reputation may continue to follow a stringent monetary policy even if the 
contemporaneous cost in output is significant.  The argument is that by reneging on its 
inflation promises, the monetary authority generates negative spillovers that impose a 
greater damage in future unemployment than the potential benefits of generating some 
(unanticipated) present inflation. 102 
 













































































































     *Source: Banco de Mexico 
 
                                                 
102 This is an empirical matter yet to be explored.  See Blanchard and Fischer (1989) for a theoretical 
discussion. 
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2.4.  The Model. 
Following Drazen and Masson (1993) (DM), a two-period model of reputation 
is presented where unemployment persistence will arise depending upon the monetary 
authority’s policy choice.  The single-period loss function for the monetary authority is 
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for t=1, 2; i = T (tough), W (weak) such that WT θθ >  > 0.  iθ  is the policymakers 
preference for inflation or its type and U
~
 is the target rate of unemployment in any 
period.103  This implies that a tough policymaker dislikes inflation more than a weak 
one.  It is assumed that iθ  is private information to the policymaker, but the public has 
prior beliefs on the type of policymaker.104  A policymaker minimizes the present 
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where β  is the discount factor, subject to 
 
                                                 
103 U~  is the natural rate of unemployment defined as in Kydland and Prescott (1977). 
104 As in Backus and Driffill (1985). 
104 
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where ε t is a random shock with mean zero and limited variance; δ is a positive 
constant (see below) and etπ  is expected inflation in period t, taken as given.
105   
In DM, unemployment persistence is exogenous since it exists regardless of the 
policymaker’s choice in the first period, but its magnitude can be affected by the 
policymaker’s choice.  The key difference from DM is that here the term δπ1 in (4) 
replaces δaU1, with U1 given by (3).  Therefore, persistence itself is endogenous to the 
policy choice in the first period.  The idea is that there are real effects from monetary 
policy beyond those from the expectations/reputation mechanism tha t are captured by 
the term δπ1.  In other words, unemployment in the first period will only affect 
subsequent unemployment whenever π1 > 0 is observed.  Suppose that individuals face 
a cash-in-advance constraint for investment on productive capacity in the future such 
that positive inflation reduces the real value of their savings, reduces future productive 
capacity, and raises future unemployment.  In the context of an open economy, 
inflation could also generate currency depreciation that may translate into currency 
                                                 
105 In a different context, Giannoni and Woodford (2003) use a similar specification for inflation.  In 
their analysis, the presence of lagged inflation (inflation inertia) is explained through price indexation in 
a Calvo-type model of staggered price setting.  See also Orphanides and Williams (2003) and 
Orphanides and Lengwiler (1999).  The interpretation of lagged inflation in equation (4) here is slightly 
different (see below). 
105 
mismatches and balance-sheet effects that may reduce demand and supply of home 
goods. 
It is assumed that the policymaker can only choose between setting π t = 0 or  
π t = π  (exactly as in DM).  Choosing positive inflation in the first period would 
impose an additional future cost in unemployment.  Given a first period shock ε1, the 
monetary authority faces a tradeoff between lowering period 1 unemployment by 
choosing positive inflation and avoiding higher unemployment in period 2 by keeping 
inflation at zero in the first period.   
Solving backward, we start by determining a critical shock for period 2 for 
which type i policymaker will be indifferent between setting zero and positive inflation 
( 2ε̂ ).  Hence in period 2, the policymaker can find ε such that 
iL2 (π2 = π ) = 
iL2 (π2 = 
0).  As in DM, define µ2(π1) as the probability that inflation in period 2 is positive 
given inflation in period 1, so that etπ  = µ2(π1)π .  Thus 
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a ii      (7), 
 
which is analogous to equation (4) in DM.  )(ˆ 12 πε
i  is the critical shock to 
unemployment in period 2 such that a policymaker of type i is indifferent between 
setting positive and zero inflation in that period given its past action.  If ε2 > )(ˆ 12 πε
i , 
then the policymaker will find it optimal to set π2 = π .  Notice that, all else equal, 
whenever π1 >0, then the magnitude of the shock necessary to set π2 >0 is lower since 
the last term in (7) disappears.   
In a similar fashion, one can solve for period 1’s i1̂ε (P) such that 
)()0( 11 πππ =Λ==Λ
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where P defines a set of prior beliefs about the policymaker’s type (prob(θ = θ i )) and 
the distribution of ε. 

























P  (10), 
 
and if ε1 > )(ˆ1 P
iε , then the policymaker will find it optimal to set π1 = π .   
Assuming that ε t is uniformly distributed between -v and v, then the term in 
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Following DM, define m(π1)=aµ2(π1) U
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Using the fact that =)(ˆ 12 πε






, equation (13) can be 
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−−+= .  Since setting inflation equal to zero in the 
first period does not generate any distortions that affect unemployment in the second 
period, the term πδ is eliminated from the first term in brackets for E1L2i(0).  It can be 
shown that E1[ )0()( 22
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and so long as δ = 0, equation (15) would be analogous to equation (A4) in DM.   
To determine the sign of (15), we first need to determine the sign of µ2(π ) – 
µ2(0).  For that purpose, as in DM, we define µ2(π1) = p2(π1) q2T(π1) + [1-p2(π1)] q2W(π1) 
as the probability that positive inflation is observed in period 2 given observed inflation 
in period 1 (π1), where p2(π1) is the probability that the policymaker is of type T and 
q2i(π1) is the probability that a monetary authority of type i will inflate in period 2 given 
π1 = π .  Notice that, by (7) and the uniform distribution of ε t, the latter will be given by 
 
 q2i(π1) = prob [ε2 > )(ˆ 12 πε








 q1i = prob [ε1 > )(ˆ1 P
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, where q1i is the 
probability that a policymaker of type i will set π1 = π .   
The key result is that, as opposed to DM, the sign of µ2(π ) - µ2(0) will be 
unambiguously positive (assuming δ in equation (4) is positive): 
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Equation (18) is analogous to equation (7) in DM.  However, if δ > 0, then there 
would be an additional benefit to the policymaker to set π1 = 0 other than the signaling 
(reputation) effect given by the second term in brackets.  Conversely, if positive 
inflation is observed in the first period, not only there is a cost on reputation, but also a 
future unemployment cost due to the negative spillover explained previously.  If δ = 0, 
the result is the standard Backus and Driffill (1985) result, where observing zero 
inflation in the first period increases the probability of observing zero inflation in the 
second period (given a set of shocks {ε1, ε2}) and hence increases reputation.   
An interesting implication of this modification to DM’s model is that whenever 
a policymaker is “forced” to inflate in the first period, it will find it more costly to 
reach a zero- inflation target in the second period.  This implies that even a weak 
policymaker will have a greater incentive not to inflate in the first period, and the shock 
required for a policymaker to inflate in that period should be higher.  The existence of 
this negative spillover in the second period that depends on the actions observed in the 
first period will benefit a weak type in the sense that the return to investment in 
reputation is higher than if this effect was not present.  Moreover, for the tough 
policymaker it would be harder to reach its goal of zero inflation in the second period if 
it inflates in the first period.  The inclusion of this type of effect may explain why the 
monetary authorities in Mexico still follow a stringent monetary policy and the gap 
111 
between inflation expectations and inflation announcements has continued to close, at 
the cost of sluggish economic recovery.   
 
2.5.  Conclusions. 
Part of the literature on inflation targeting has focused on the role of exchange 
rate variations in small open economies.  While fear of floating can be explained as a 
result of high exchange rate passthrough to prices, balance sheet effects and country 
risk volatility associated with lack of credibility, its temporary nature has not yet been 
explored in depth in theoretical or empirical work.  A modification of Drazen and 
Mason’s (1994) paper, where unemployment persistence plays a key role in 
determining the credibility of a policy separated from the concept of reputation, has 
been explored.  In this paper, the idea is that, under asymmetric information about 
policymaker’s types, a government’s reaction to an exogenous shock that seems 
optimal in the short run may introduce negative spillovers to economic agents such that 
there are future costs to such reactions over and above the negative effect on the 
government’s reputation.   
In Mexico, for example, the central bank continues to follow a stringent 
monetary policy in the sense that it signals a high commitment to setting low inflation.  
Even though this strong commitment may translate into short run output costs, at the 
same time the central bank may be aiming at avoiding harmful effects from deviating 
from its promises by not only losing reputation but introducing additional distortions 
that may be more costly in the long run. 
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Level 1st Difference Integration
Overnight Interbank Interest Rate -2.53 -7.45 1% -4.10
5% -3.48 1
10% -3.17
Credibility Gap -1.19 -3.79 1% -3.55
5% -2.92 1
10% -2.60
Output Gap -1.39 -5.34 1% -4.10
5% -3.48 1
10% -3.17
Nominal Exchange Rate -1.62 -8.09 1% -3.97
5% -3.42 1
10% -3.13
UMS26 -3.67 -7.59 1% -4.10
5% -3.48 0-1
10% -3.17
Terms of Trade -1.67 -5.69 1% -4.10
5% -3.48 1
10% -3.17
Oil Prices -1.61 -5.79 1% -3.97
5% -3.42 1
10% -3.13
Unit Root Tests (monthly frequencies)
ADF Statistic Critical 
Value
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Result for Mexico Using Daily Data 




lagged nominal overnight interest rate 0.41*** 0.41***
(0.06) (0.06)
expected inflation 2.42*** 2.33***
(0.35) (0.37)
announced inflation -1.72*** -1.63***
(0.34) (0.36)
lagged observed inflation -0.22** -0.22**
(0.10) (0.10)
output gap (sa) 0.42*** 0.42***
(0.06) (0.06)
lagged exchange rate depreciation -0.04 -0.06
(0.04) (0.05)
govt. bond yield abroad 2.61*** 2.75***
(0.36) (0.37)
lagged change in oil prices -0.04*** -0.05***
(0.01) (0.01)
R Sq 0.93 0.93
Adj R Sq 0.93 0.93
Std. Error 1.70 1.70
Sum Squared Resid 3419.69 3421.18
F Stat 2101.04 -
Prob 0.0000 -
J Stat - 0.0000
No. of Observations 1197 1196
1/ Instrument list includes lags of dependent variable, lags of 
observed inflation and lags of explanatory variables
*, ** and *** denote 10%, 5% and 1% significance respectively
Std. Errors in parentheses







Appendix 2.  Endogenous Structural Change Tests Using Daily Data. 
This output corresponds to the test for the regressions in column (a) of Table 
1.7 and Table 1.8.  The lagged dependent variable is the observation in t-1 (daily lag).  
In this case p=0 and q=7 since all variables are allowed to change across regimes.  
There is evidence of at least 1 structural break, which is supported by using the 
sequential procedure result.   
 
Table A2.1. Daily Lagged Dep. Var. Allowed to Change 
Set of regressors: RHS of Equation (2)  
Max number of breaks allowed (M): 5  
SupFT(k) test for (fixed) number of structural breaks  
k=1 k=2 k=3 k=4 k=5 UDMax1/ WDMax1/ 
34.10* 34.09* 32.46* 28.53* 26.65* 34.10* 43.50* 
SupF(i+1,i) test for i vs. i+1 structural breaks 
i=1 i=2 i=3 i=4 i=5 
16.32 20.20 19.19 19.19 -  
 Number of breaks selected 
Sequential Procedure 1* 
LWZ Procedure 0 
BIC Procedure 2  
 Estimated dates2/  
1̂T  2̂T  3̂T  4̂T  5̂T  
9/22/98** - - - - 
 
(9/15/98-
4/27/99) - - - -  
1/ UDMax and WDMax tests for unknown number of structural breaks. 
2/ Intervals reported are significant at 5% level. 
* Indicates 5% significance level. 




Appendix 2.  (continued) 
This output also corresponds to the test for the regressions in column (a) of 
Table 1.7 and Table 1.8.  The lagged dependent variable is the observation in t-1 (daily 
lag).  However, in this case p=1 and q=6 since the lagged dependent variable is not 
allowed to change across regimes.  There is evidence of at least 1 structural break as 
indicated by the UDmax and WDmax tests.  3 structural breaks are significant at the 5 
percent level using the sequential procedure result.   
 
Table A2.2: Daily Lagged Dep. Var. Not Allowed to Change 
Set of regressors: RHS of Equation (2) 
except lagged dep. var.  
Max number of breaks allowed (M): 5  
SupFT(k) test for (fixed) number of structural breaks  
k=1 k=2 k=3 k=4 k=5 UDMax1/ WDMax1/ 
43.42* 33.80* 28.12* 19.56* 17.54* 43.42* 43.42* 
SupF(i+1,i) test for i vs. i+1 structural breaks 
i=1 i=2 i=3 i=4 i=5 
34.53* 28.90* 19.44 - -  
 Number of breaks selected 
Sequential Procedure 3* 
LWZ Procedure 0 
BIC Procedure 0  
 Estimated dates2/  
1̂T  2̂T  3̂T  4̂T  5̂T  







4/26/01) - -  
1/ UDMax and WDMax tests for unknown number of structural breaks. 
2/ Intervals reported are significant at 5% level. 
* Indicates 5% significance level. 
** Selected estimated break(s). 
 
116 
Appendix 2.  (continued) 
This output corresponds to a similar specification for the regressions in column 
(a) of Table 1.7 and Table 1.8.  The difference is that the lagged dependent variable is 
the observation in t-20 (monthly lag).  In this case p=0 and q=7 since the lagged 
dependent variable is allowed to change across regimes.  4 structural breaks are 
identified as supported by the sequential method.   
 
Table A2.3: Monthly Lagged Dep. Var. Allowed to Change 
Set of regressors: RHS of Equation (2)   
Max number of breaks allowed (M): 5  
SupFT(k) test for (fixed) number of structural breaks  
k=1 k=2 k=3 k=4 k=5 UDMax1/ WDMax1/ 
35.96* 138.49* 151.43* 142.78* 208.43* 208.43* 340.18* 
SupF(i+1,i) test for i vs. i+1 structural breaks 
i=1 i=2 i=3 i=4 i=5 
75.37* 144.85* 24.89 - -  
 Number of breaks selected 
Sequential Procedure 4* 
LWZ Procedure 3 
BIC Procedure 4  
 Estimated dates2/  
1̂T  2̂T  3̂T  4̂T  5̂T  









11/30/00) -  
1/ UDMax and WDMax tests for unknown number of structural breaks. 
2/ Intervals reported are significant at 5% level. 
* Indicates 5% significance level. 
** Selected estimated break(s). 
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Appendix 2.  (continued) 
This output corresponds to a similar specification for the regressions in column 
(a) of Table 1.7 and Table 1.8.  The difference is that the lagged dependent variable is 
the observation in t-20 (monthly lag).  In this case p=1 and q=6 since the lagged 
dependent variable is not allowed to change across regimes.  4 structural breaks are 
identified as supported by the sequential method.   
 
Table A2.4: Monthly Lagged Dep. Var. Not Allowed to Change 
Set of regressors: RHS of Equation (2) 
except lagged dep. var.  
Max number of breaks allowed (M): 5  
SupFT(k) test for (fixed) number of structural breaks  
k=1 k=2 k=3 k=4 k=5 UDMax1/ WDMax1/ 
53.25* 179.24* 219.66* 121.66* 196.62* 219.66* 330.67* 
SupF(i+1,i) test for i vs. i+1 structural breaks 
i=1 i=2 i=3 i=4 i=5 
72.03* 64.61* 26.55* - -  
 Number of breaks selected 
Sequential Procedure 4* 
LWZ Procedure 3 
BIC Procedure 4  
 Estimated dates2/  
1̂T  2̂T  3̂T  4̂T  5̂T  









11/22/00) -  
1/ UDMax and WDMax tests for unknown number of structural breaks. 
2/ Intervals reported are significant at 5% level. 
* Indicates 5% significance level. 
** Selected estimated break(s). 
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Appendix 2.  (continued) 
This output corresponds to the test for the regressions in column (b) of Table 
1.7 and Table 1.8.  In this case p=0 and q=7 since the lagged dependent variable is 
allowed to change across regimes.  4 breaks are identified following the sequential 
method. 
 
Table A2.5: Lagged Dep. Var. Allowed to Change 
Set of regressors: RHS of Equation (2).  
Max number of breaks allowed (M): 5  
SupFT(k) test for (fixed) number of structural breaks  
k=1 k=2 k=3 k=4 k=5 UDMax1/ WDMax1/ 
55.86* 169.42* 156.06* 156.47* 234.05* 234.05* 381.99* 
SupF(i+1,i) test for i vs. i+1 structural breaks 
i=1 i=2 i=3 i=4 i=5 
116.49* 100.07* 721.00 - -  
 Number of breaks selected 
Sequential Procedure 4* 
LWZ Procedure 3 
BIC Procedure 5  
 Estimated dates2/  
1̂T  2̂T  3̂T  4̂T  5̂T  









12/11/00) -  
1/ UDMax and WDMax tests for unknown number of structural breaks. 
2/ Intervals reported are significant at 5% level. 
* Indicates 5% significance level. 
** Selected estimated break(s). 
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Appendix 2.  (continued) 
This output also corresponds to the test for the regressions in column (b) of 
Table 1.7 and Table 1.8.  In this case p=1 and q=6 since the lagged dependent variable 
is not allowed to change across regimes.  4 breaks are identified using the sequential 
method. 
 
Table A2.6: Lagged Dep. Var. Not Allowed to Change 
Set of regressors: RHS of Equation (2) 
except lagged dep. var.  
Max number of breaks allowed (M): 5  
SupFT(k) test for (fixed) number of structural breaks  
k=1 k=2 k=3 k=4 k=5 UDMax1/ WDMax1/ 
82.72* 81.74* 152.70* 208.62* 323.19* 323.19* 543.52* 
SupF(i+1,i) test for i vs. i+1 structural breaks 
i=1 i=2 i=3 i=4 i=5 
108.76* 108.76* 22.41 - -  
 Number of breaks selected 
Sequential Procedure 4* 
LWZ Procedure 3 
BIC Procedure 5  
 Estimated dates2/  
1̂T  2̂T  3̂T  4̂T  5̂T  









11/21/00) -  
1/ UDMax and WDMax tests for unknown number of structural breaks. 
2/ Intervals reported are significant at 5% level. 
* Indicates 5% significance level. 
** Selected estimated break(s). 
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Appendix 2.  (continued) 
This output corresponds to the test for the regressions in column (d) of Table 
1.7 and Table 1.8, where the monthly lagged observed inflation is included as a 
regressor.  In this case p=0 and q=8 since all variables are allowed to change across 
regimes.  4 breaks are selected as shown by the sequential procedure. 
 
Table A2.7: Lagged Observed Inflation 
Set of regressors: as in column (d) of Table 1.7 and Table 1.8 
Max number of breaks allowed (M): 5  
SupFT(k) test for (fixed) number of structural breaks  
k=1 k=2 k=3 k=4 k=5 UDMax1/ WDMax1/ 
55.83* 148.92* 382.00* 365.54* 337.46* 382.00* 550.76* 
SupF(i+1,i) test for i vs. i+1 structural breaks 
i=1 i=2 i=3 i=4 i=5 
294.67* 260.61* 32.77* - -  
 Number of breaks selected 
Sequential Procedure 4* 
LWZ Procedure 3 
BIC Procedure 5  
 Estimated dates2/  
1̂T  2̂T  3̂T  4̂T  5̂T  









11/21/00) -  
1/ UDMax and WDMax tests for unknown number of structural breaks. 
2/ Intervals reported are significant at 5% level. 
* Indicates 5% significance level. 




Appendix 2.  (continued) 
This output corresponds to the test for the regressions in column (e) of Table 
1.7 and Table 1.8, where the monthly lagged observed inflation is omitted from the set 
of regressors.  In this case p=0 and q=7 since all variables are allowed to change across 
regimes.  Evidence supports the presence of 3 structural breaks using the same criterion 
as for previous tests. 
 
Table A2.8: Endogenous Structural Change Tests 
Set of regressors: as in column (e) of Table 1.7 and Table 1.8 
Max number of breaks allowed (M): 5  
SupFT(k) test for (fixed) number of structural breaks  
k=1 k=2 k=3 k=4 k=5 UDMax1/ WDMax1/ 
200.52* 230.55* 404.48* 494.26* 504.58* 504.58* 848.58* 
SupF(i+1,i) test for i vs. i+1 structural breaks 
i=1 i=2 i=3 i=4 i=5 
54.29* 318.82* 18.16 - -  
 Number of breaks selected 
Sequential Procedure 3* 
LWZ Procedure 3 
BIC Procedure 5  
 Estimated dates2/  
1̂T  2̂T  3̂T  4̂T  5̂T  







11/23/00) - -  
1/ UDMax and WDMax tests for unknown number of structural breaks. 
2/ Intervals reported are significant at 5% level. 
* Indicates 5% significance level. 












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1 55 109 163 217 271 325 379 433 487 541 595 649
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1 55 109 163 217 271 325 379 433 487 541 595 649
Rate of Change of Oil Prices (trade 
measure)
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Table A53/ Endogenous Structural Change Tests  
for New Zealand using quarterly data 
Max number of breaks allowed (M): 5  
SupFT(k) test for (fixed) number of structural breaks  
k=1 k=2 k=3 k=4 k=5 UDMax1/ WDMax1/ 
28.73* 29.58* 102.46* 171.61* 186.83* 186.83* 314.19* 
SupF(i+1,i) test for i vs. i+1 structural breaks 
i=1 i=2 i=3 i=4 i=5 
13.34 23.62* 15.90 11.22 -  
 Number of breaks selected 
Sequential Procedure 1* 
LWZ Procedure 0 
BIC Procedure 0  
 Estimated dates2/  
1̂T  2̂T  3̂T  4̂T  5̂T  
1997:1** - - - - 
 
(1996:2-
1997:2) - - - -  
1/ UDMax and WDMax tests for unknown number of structural breaks. 
2/ Intervals reported are significant at 5% level. 
3/ All coefficients allowed to change (no lagged dep var). 
* Indicates 5% significance level. 
** Selected estimated break(s). 
 
Interpretation follows from previous examples. 
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Appendix 6.  Endogenous Structural Change Tests for Canada (Monthly Data). 
 
 
Table A63 Endogenous Structural Change Tests 
for Canada using monthly data 
Max number of breaks allowed (M): 5  
SupFT(k) test for (fixed) number of structural breaks  
k=1 k=2 k=3 k=4 k=5 UDMax1/ WDMax1/ 
466.53* 1221.23* 444.69* 381.98* 487.26* 1221.23* 1411.76* 
SupF(i+1,i) test for i vs. i+1 structural breaks 
i=1 i=2 i=3 i=4 i=5 
424.43* 80.22* 62.25* - -  
 Number of breaks selected 
Sequential Procedure 4* 
LWZ Procedure 2 
BIC Procedure 4  
 Estimated dates2/  
1̂T  2̂T  3̂T  4̂T  5̂T  
3/93** 12/94** 9/96** 8/99** - 
 (1/93-4/93) (10/94-1/95) (7/96-10/96) (6/99-9/99) -  
1/ UDMax and WDMax tests for unknown number of structural breaks. 
2/ Intervals reported are significant at 5% level. 
3/ All coefficients allowed to change (no lagged dep var). 
* Indicates 5% significance level. 
** Selected estimated break(s). 
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